Friday, 3 October 2014

Meanwhile, in the other caliphate...



With the attention of the world focussing on the ongoing air campaign against the Islamic State (a.k.a. ISIL, ISIS or Daesh) in Northern Iraq and Syria, the "other" Caliphate, known as Boko Haram, has decided to grab back some of the limelight. After all, Boko Haram did manage to trigger one of the most star studded Twitter campaigns by kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in the Northern Nigerian city of Chibok, in mid April. It is estimated that Boko Haram still holds around 200 of the girls. It would seem Twitter has its limits.

The latest video depicts the movements leader, Abubakar Shekau, proclaiming to still being alive, despite claims by Nigerian Security Services back in late September. This is the third time that Shekau (if indeed it is him) has been declared dead by the Nigerian authorities, the last allegations occurring in 2009 and 2013. Speaking in a mixture of Arabic and Hausa, Shekau expatiated how Boko Haram was to lead the caliphate (essentially territory controlled by the group in Northern Nigeria and the border regions with Cameroon, Chad and Niger), as well as describing the various forms of punishment to be doled out according to Sharia law in said caliphate. 

Boko Haram was the first organisation to swear loyalty to the Islamic State led by Abu Bakr al-Bagdahdi, back in mid July. Boko Haram later then declared its own caliphate on the 24th of Augustafter capturing the town of Gwoza in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram shares many similarities with the Islamic State. Both groups groups are considered to be part of the Salafist movement and preach strict practice of Islam and the uncompromising application of Sharia law in the territories they control. Both have taken advantage of porous borders regions, incompetent and corrupt local governments and Western complacency to expand their influence and territorial gains. Both have made the news headlines around the world for the acts of extreme violence committed against civilian and military personnel that are unfortunate enough to get caught in their web. And finally both organisations reject post-colonial nation-state boundaries, which in the case of Boko Haram, means threatening at least four nations at the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa. 

However the two Caliphates have differences both in origins and capabilities. Though both groups have bolstered their military capabilities by seizing military hardware from fleeing (often numerically superior) government troops, Boko Haram neither posses the same manpower (thought to hover between 5000- 10000 men) nor financial means to sustain itself the same way the IS does. Boko Haram's successes are probably more due to military incompetence on behalf of Nigeria than actual martial prowess. A case in point is the groups more mediocre performances during incursions in neighbouring Cameroon and Chad. 

Initially founded by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram fell under the leadership of Shekau in 2009, after Yusuf was shot dead by Nigerian policeman. Shekau is often credited for being responsible for the increasingly hard-line and violent stance taken by the sect since he first joined them in 2003 and became one of Yusuf's most trusted lieutenants. Whilst little is known about Shekau himself (his nationality and even date of birth are debated), he quickly gained a reputation for violence and fanaticism. Deemed to lack the religious education, the oratory skill or the restraint of his mentor, he assumed command by spreading terror both within and without the organisation. Under his five year leadership, Boko Haram began targeting civilians and local security forcesas well as reinforcing its ties with Islamic groups operating in the Sahel and Sahara such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine. Its ties with regional and international movements and its capabilities to operate with relative impunity in Northern Nigeria, Southern Chad and Niger and North-Western Cameroon make Boko Haram a truly significant threat for both regional stability and Western interests. 

So what are the solutions ? Like all asymmetrical threats, the answer may be in part military but it has to go beyond that. Although arguably one of the best funded militaries in Africa, the Nigerian's army performance has been frankly lacking. Stories of troops fleeing in the face of smaller numbers of insurgents abound. Further allegations of crimes being committed by Nigerian security forces and local "self defence" militias have not helped. Like all insurgent groups, Boko Haram has been both enabled and marginalised by corrupt and incompetent local authorities. Non state armed groups like Boko Haram tend to fill the void left by inadequate governance by governments. It seems however that the Nigerians at least have understood, and the authorities have decided to adopt a "softer" approach, trying to win back local (mostly Muslim) communities in the North, potential recruits for Boko Haram, by reaffirming the role of local administrations and trying to undo the harm created by the local self defence militias. This is counter-insurgency 101 and of course the military has a role in all this: clearing and securing territory from the insurgents, enabling local authorities to reconstitute themselves and assert state authority and services. 

However, from an international standpoint, Boko Haram remains a mostly African problem. Though Nigeria's plight received attention after the highly mediatised kidnapping of the 276 schoolgirls, external help came mainly from the deployment of "experts" and access to intelligence and surveillance data in order to help with the rescue of the hostages. And the West seems far more preoccupied with the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The major Western military power in the region, France, has military presence in both Niger and Chad, however this is to support France's ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the Sahara and the Sahel. If anything, the current situation in Libya means that the French are looking to shift their dispositions North rather than South. The French are also heavily involved in the Central African Republic. Simply put, France does not really have the capabilities at the moment to offer significant military aid to Nigeria. What the West can offer is training and advice as well as ISTAR capabilities to Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. It is up to these nations to concert their efforts if Boko Haram is to be defeated. 

Arguably the greatest weakness of Boko Haram and IS are their own brutal methods that have exponentially increased as both groups have moved into an expansionist mindset. Key to the defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the "ancestor" or IS, was their brutal behaviour towards the Sunni communities that harboured them. The Americans were able to capitalise on the growing sense of rejection thanks to the surge. American troops were not only able to re-take and hold ground from the insurgents, the protection they provided to the Sunni communities laid the ground for the "reconciliation" of these communities with the Iraqi State. Dubbed the "Anbar Awakening", this event can provide a viable model for Nigerian efforts. By all accounts, Boko Haram are as brutal as IS towards the civilians they rule over, and Shekau's fanatical "mad dog" behaviour has driven deep divisions within the group. Boko Haram is a symptom of an illness that has been plaguing the developing world for decades. Ethnic tensions and poor governance have created breeding grounds for armed groups to take the place of governments. As David Kilcullen would argue, the most successful of these groups are the ones that manage to emulate the full spectrum of services and roles of the traditional state. These are few and far between anddespite their claims of establishing Calipahtes, both Boko Haram and IS are far from functioning as states in their own rights. Both groups rule by violence and fanaticism, and it will be their downfall in the end. Boko Haram may have been eclipsed by IS, but we must not forget that their campaign has claimed the lives of thousands and the group will have to be dealt with. Sooner rather than later. 

Thursday, 3 July 2014

Hardly a breeze: selling the Mistral to Russia





On Monday 30th June, after a few days’ delay, the RFS Smolny docked in Saint Nazaire, France. This marked another crucial milestone in France's controversial programme to sell two of its Mistral Class amphibious assault ships to the Russian Navy.

Referred to by the French as a Projection and Command Vessel, the Mistral can be host to 16 helicopters (medium lift or gunship), 70 vehicles including up to 13 main battle tanks (or 40 is fully loaded with MBTs), 450 soldiers and 69 hospital beds, alongside all the necessary command and control facilities from which to conduct its many missions. Three currently serve in the French Navy (their flagship the Mistral, followed by the Tonnerre and the Dixmude) have participated in numerous missions from Lebanon, Libya, Ivory Coast and Mali to name a few. The Russian Navy expressed interest in the platform and a deal was announced back in 2011 for two ships, adapted to Russian specifications.  

The 400 Russian sailors aboard the Smolny (a training ship) will begin formal training on their new vessel, christened the Vladivostok, under the supervision of the Défense Conseil International (DCI), an agency specialising in training and handover of French military equipment to foreign customers. The second vessel, ironically dubbed the Sevastopol, is still under final assembly in France.

The deal came under immediate criticism from the US first and foremost, followed by the Baltic and Scandinavian states, always wary of possible Russian aggression. US Republicans had been vocal in opposing the sale of such highly advanced platform to Russia since 2009, following a statement by Admiral Vyssotski a year earlier that the possession of such a platform would have had allowed him to project forces in 40 mins rather than 26 hours during the Russian intervention of South Ossetia in 2008. This statement, although hyperbole, helped fuel the idea that modern arms sales would enable Russia to further destabilise its border regions. Further concerns were expressed about NATO technology and protocols potentially falling into Russian hands: asimilar criticism was levelled at Turkey (the second largest NATO partner) after it expressed the desire to purchase Chinese made SAM systems earlier in the year.

Fast forward and the Ukrainian crisis has once again brought the sale of the Mistral to the fore. Joining the rest of the West in condemnation of Russia's actions, the French have yet to firmly announce the cancellation of the contract -  to the renewed disapproval of the US. And in a move that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, Polands' own Defence Minister has publicly declared his opposition to the sale.

However successive French governments have held firm.

Cancelling the contract now would incur large penalties for the French state and put its reputation at risk. The French arms industry is the fourth largest in France and is still highly dependent on French acquisitions, especially the land component. Exports account for around a third revenue, and with dwindling French defence budgets, the industry is increasingly looking outwards. France is the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, so a cancellation of such an important, high profile contract would be an unwelcome blow to its standing. Something the Russians have picked up quite astutely. Following a visit to Washington by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who was questioned regarding the sale, Rosobronexport, the Russian state-owned arms export agency, made a statement declaring that the Mistral acquisition process was on track and praising the reliability of their French partners. And more recently, President Putin declared that he believed the record fine imposed by US authorities on the French bank, BNP Paribas, was blackmail to get the French to back off and cancel the contract. A statement that has no doubt caused significant irritation in Washington and Paris. Probably because there is some truth to it. 

Some have suggested that France sell or lease the two ships to other other NATO members, or even to NATO itself, though there has been little appetite for either idea so far. But do these ships actually pose a significant threat to European security if they were to fall in Russian hands? Probably not. Or at least they would not significantly upset the current balance we see today.

Firstlyonly the Sevastopol will be deployed in Europe (the name is the give-away). The other ship will be deployed to the Pacific fleet to address China's and Japan's growing assertiveness in relation to the various ongoing territorial disputes there. Disregarding Admiral Vyssotski's rather grandiose statement, the real added value of these ships to the Russians lies not in their amphibious assault capabilities (which they already possess), but rather in their command and control capabilities. These ships are intended as stopgaps anyway, whilst the domestic Russian industry matures enough to build their own amphibious assault ships. Cancelling the contract would simply delay the inevitable, not  prevent it altogether. The sale of the Mistrals is simply a reality that the Baltic States (and NATO) will have to come to terms with. Perhaps sooner than anticipated. 

Sunday, 2 March 2014

Russia and the Crimea: Protecting minorities or protecting the Black Sea Fleet ?




The events currently unfolding in Ukraine are troubling and potentially extremely volatile. As the time of writing, it is estimated that around 2000 Russian troops are now present in Crimea, occupying key strategic locations. The Ukrainian interim government has now declared military mobilisation and is accusing the Russians of breaching Ukraine's territorial integrity. Tensions are running high. 

Russia is claiming that the mobilisation of troops is designed to help protect the Russian speaking minorities heavily present in the Crimea, but make no mistake - this is just a pretext being exploited by the Russian government in the wake of the Maidan movement in Kiev. Any student of history would tell you that the Russians don't exactly have a great track record when it comes to the protection of minorities (both within its own borders and without). The true interest of the Russians lies in Sevastopol. 

The great city of Sevastopol is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the Russians would be loth to lose control of it. Ever since the great power ambitions of the Tsars, access to the world’s ocean has been a primary concern of Russian strategic pursuits all the way through the Soviet period and into the Russian Federation. Russia ability to project power and safeguard its interest is directly linked to its ability for its military and merchant navies to navigate every corner of the world’s oceans. Naval power is just as important today as it was in the 18th Century. Indeed Sevastopol and the Black Fleet are Russia's only significant access to the Mediterranean (discounting the small Russian logistical port in Syria). And even then, their access was hampered by the Bosphorus Straight, controlled by Turkey, a major NATO member, and before that by the Ottoman Empire. Russian access to the Atlantic is also problematic, with the North Sea ports being difficult to navigate in winter and access to the Atlantic being blocked off by primarily by the Turks, but also the British in Gibraltar.

With these strategic considerations in mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant challenge to Russian ambitions in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Could a new independent Ukraine be trusted to safeguard Russian naval interests? If Russian involvement in Ukrainian domestic affairs during the last two decades or so are any indication, then the answer is no. And present circumstances may have proven them right. The Russians initially signed a lease with Ukraine, granting them joint access to Sevastopol (alongside the Ukrainian navy). This lease was initially supposed to expire in 2017, but was extended to 2042 by then President Viktor Yanukovych. The same Yanukovych who is on the run after being "deposed" by the Maidan movement. The current opposition in the new interim government has threatened to rescind the lease extension, which would kick the Black Sea Fleet out of Ukraine in 2017.  

Not only is Russia’s tenuous hold of their naval power in the Western hemisphere under threat, but Ukraine remains the last buffer zone in the West against European (EU integration) and American (NATO expansion) influence. A pro-European Ukraine would mark the death knell of Russian influence in Europe. This imperialistic consideration survived the Soviet Union and is still very present today, though obviously not unique to Russia. In many ways Russia’s leaders today are very much products of the Cold War.   

So what now? It is clear that the Russians are employing the same strategy that they did during the Georgian conflict in 2008. Under pretext of protecting minorities, the Russians are undergoing significant military build-up in foreign territory. Perhaps in the hopes of goading the Ukrainians into attacking first, as the Georgians did. Like Georgia this would increase Russian legitimacy and severely restrict any form of assistance Ukraine could receive from the West. No-one in Europe and America wants a direct military conflict with the Russians; after all we spent four decades trying to avoid doing so. This sentiment is perhaps best echoed in the weakness of President Obama’s statement yesterday regarding the situation.  

It is clear though that the claim of protecting the Russian minorities in the Crimea is just a pretext to justify Russia’s military build-up. The key objective here is Sevastopol, a key infrastructure to support Russia world power ambitions. Geography has always been a significant hurdle for Russian strategic ambitions and they will not let anything threaten their hold on warm water ports. Whether this is accomplished through the annexation of Crimea or through more peaceful means remains to be seen.