Russia and the Crimea: Protecting minorities or protecting the Black Sea Fleet ?

The events currently unfolding in Ukraine are troubling and potentially extremely volatile. As the time of writing, it is estimated that around 2000 Russian troops are now present in Crimea, occupying key strategic locations. The Ukrainian interim government has now declared military mobilisation and is accusing the Russians of breaching Ukraine's territorial integrity. Tensions are running high. 

Russia is claiming that the mobilisation of troops is designed to help protect the Russian speaking minorities heavily present in the Crimea, but make no mistake - this is just a pretext being exploited by the Russian government in the wake of the Maidan movement in Kiev. Any student of history would tell you that the Russians don't exactly have a great track record when it comes to the protection of minorities (both within its own borders and without). The true interest of the Russians lies in Sevastopol. 

The great city of Sevastopol is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the Russians would be loth to lose control of it. Ever since the great power ambitions of the Tsars, access to the world’s ocean has been a primary concern of Russian strategic pursuits all the way through the Soviet period and into the Russian Federation. Russia ability to project power and safeguard its interest is directly linked to its ability for its military and merchant navies to navigate every corner of the world’s oceans. Naval power is just as important today as it was in the 18th Century. Indeed Sevastopol and the Black Fleet are Russia's only significant access to the Mediterranean (discounting the small Russian logistical port in Syria). And even then, their access was hampered by the Bosphorus Straight, controlled by Turkey, a major NATO member, and before that by the Ottoman Empire. Russian access to the Atlantic is also problematic, with the North Sea ports being difficult to navigate in winter and access to the Atlantic being blocked off by primarily by the Turks, but also the British in Gibraltar.

With these strategic considerations in mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant challenge to Russian ambitions in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Could a new independent Ukraine be trusted to safeguard Russian naval interests? If Russian involvement in Ukrainian domestic affairs during the last two decades or so are any indication, then the answer is no. And present circumstances may have proven them right. The Russians initially signed a lease with Ukraine, granting them joint access to Sevastopol (alongside the Ukrainian navy). This lease was initially supposed to expire in 2017, but was extended to 2042 by then President Viktor Yanukovych. The same Yanukovych who is on the run after being "deposed" by the Maidan movement. The current opposition in the new interim government has threatened to rescind the lease extension, which would kick the Black Sea Fleet out of Ukraine in 2017.  

Not only is Russia’s tenuous hold of their naval power in the Western hemisphere under threat, but Ukraine remains the last buffer zone in the West against European (EU integration) and American (NATO expansion) influence. A pro-European Ukraine would mark the death knell of Russian influence in Europe. This imperialistic consideration survived the Soviet Union and is still very present today, though obviously not unique to Russia. In many ways Russia’s leaders today are very much products of the Cold War.   

So what now? It is clear that the Russians are employing the same strategy that they did during the Georgian conflict in 2008. Under pretext of protecting minorities, the Russians are undergoing significant military build-up in foreign territory. Perhaps in the hopes of goading the Ukrainians into attacking first, as the Georgians did. Like Georgia this would increase Russian legitimacy and severely restrict any form of assistance Ukraine could receive from the West. No-one in Europe and America wants a direct military conflict with the Russians; after all we spent four decades trying to avoid doing so. This sentiment is perhaps best echoed in the weakness of President Obama’s statement yesterday regarding the situation.  

It is clear though that the claim of protecting the Russian minorities in the Crimea is just a pretext to justify Russia’s military build-up. The key objective here is Sevastopol, a key infrastructure to support Russia world power ambitions. Geography has always been a significant hurdle for Russian strategic ambitions and they will not let anything threaten their hold on warm water ports. Whether this is accomplished through the annexation of Crimea or through more peaceful means remains to be seen.