With the attention of the world focussing on the ongoing air campaign against the Islamic State (a.k.a. ISIL, ISIS or Daesh) in Northern Iraq and Syria, the "other" Caliphate, known as Boko Haram, has decided to grab back some of the limelight. After all, Boko Haram did manage to trigger one of the most star studded Twitter campaigns by kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in the Northern Nigerian city of Chibok, in mid April. It is estimated that Boko Haram still holds around 200 of the girls. It would seem Twitter has its limits.
The latest video depicts the movement’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, proclaiming to still being alive, despite claims by Nigerian Security Services back in late September. This is the third time that Shekau (if indeed it is him) has been declared dead by the Nigerian authorities, the last allegations occurring in 2009 and 2013. Speaking in a mixture of Arabic and Hausa, Shekau expatiated how Boko Haram was to lead the caliphate (essentially territory controlled by the group in Northern Nigeria and the border regions with Cameroon, Chad and Niger), as well as describing the various forms of punishment to be doled out according to Sharia law in said caliphate.
Boko Haram was the first organisation to swear loyalty to the Islamic State led by Abu Bakr al-Bagdahdi, back in mid July. Boko Haram later then declared its own caliphate on the 24th of Augustafter capturing the town of Gwoza in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram shares many similarities with the Islamic State. Both groups groups are considered to be part of the Salafist movement and preach strict practice of Islam and the uncompromising application of Sharia law in the territories they control. Both have taken advantage of porous borders regions, incompetent and corrupt local governments and Western complacency to expand their influence and territorial gains. Both have made the news headlines around the world for the acts of extreme violence committed against civilian and military personnel that are unfortunate enough to get caught in their web. And finally both organisations reject post-colonial nation-state boundaries, which in the case of Boko Haram, means threatening at least four nations at the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa.
However the two Caliphates have differences both in origins and capabilities. Though both groups have bolstered their military capabilities by seizing military hardware from fleeing (often numerically superior) government troops, Boko Haram neither posses the same manpower (thought to hover between 5000- 10000 men) nor financial means to sustain itself the same way the IS does. Boko Haram's successes are probably more due to military incompetence on behalf of Nigeria than actual martial prowess. A case in point is the group’s more mediocre performances during incursions in neighbouring Cameroon and Chad.
Initially founded by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram fell under the leadership of Shekau in 2009, after Yusuf was shot dead by Nigerian policeman. Shekau is often credited for being responsible for the increasingly hard-line and violent stance taken by the sect since he first joined them in 2003 and became one of Yusuf's most trusted lieutenants. Whilst little is known about Shekau himself (his nationality and even date of birth are debated), he quickly gained a reputation for violence and fanaticism. Deemed to lack the religious education, the oratory skill or the restraint of his mentor, he assumed command by spreading terror both within and without the organisation. Under his five year leadership, Boko Haram began targeting civilians and local security forces, as well as reinforcing its ties with Islamic groups operating in the Sahel and Sahara - such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine. Its ties with regional and international movements and its capabilities to operate with relative impunity in Northern Nigeria, Southern Chad and Niger and North-Western Cameroon make Boko Haram a truly significant threat for both regional stability and Western interests.
So what are the solutions ? Like all asymmetrical threats, the answer may be in part military but it has to go beyond that. Although arguably one of the best funded militaries in Africa, the Nigerian's army performance has been frankly lacking. Stories of troops fleeing in the face of smaller numbers of insurgents abound. Further allegations of crimes being committed by Nigerian security forces and local "self defence" militias have not helped. Like all insurgent groups, Boko Haram has been both enabled and marginalised by corrupt and incompetent local authorities. Non state armed groups like Boko Haram tend to fill the void left by inadequate governance by governments. It seems however that the Nigerians at least have understood, and the authorities have decided to adopt a "softer" approach, trying to win back local (mostly Muslim) communities in the North, potential recruits for Boko Haram, by reaffirming the role of local administrations and trying to undo the harm created by the local self defence militias. This is counter-insurgency 101 and of course the military has a role in all this: clearing and securing territory from the insurgents, enabling local authorities to reconstitute themselves and assert state authority and services.
However, from an international standpoint, Boko Haram remains a mostly African problem. Though Nigeria's plight received attention after the highly mediatised kidnapping of the 276 schoolgirls, external help came mainly from the deployment of "experts" and access to intelligence and surveillance data in order to help with the rescue of the hostages. And the West seems far more preoccupied with the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The major Western military power in the region, France, has military presence in both Niger and Chad, however this is to support France's ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the Sahara and the Sahel. If anything, the current situation in Libya means that the French are looking to shift their dispositions North rather than South. The French are also heavily involved in the Central African Republic. Simply put, France does not really have the capabilities at the moment to offer significant military aid to Nigeria. What the West can offer is training and advice as well as ISTAR capabilities to Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. It is up to these nations to concert their efforts if Boko Haram is to be defeated.
Arguably the greatest weakness of Boko Haram and IS are their own brutal methods that have exponentially increased as both groups have moved into an expansionist mindset. Key to the defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the "ancestor" or IS, was their brutal behaviour towards the Sunni communities that harboured them. The Americans were able to capitalise on the growing sense of rejection thanks to the surge. American troops were not only able to re-take and hold ground from the insurgents, the protection they provided to the Sunni communities laid the ground for the "reconciliation" of these communities with the Iraqi State. Dubbed the "Anbar Awakening", this event can provide a viable model for Nigerian efforts. By all accounts, Boko Haram are as brutal as IS towards the civilians they rule over, and Shekau's fanatical "mad dog" behaviour has driven deep divisions within the group. Boko Haram is a symptom of an illness that has been plaguing the developing world for decades. Ethnic tensions and poor governance have created breeding grounds for armed groups to take the place of governments. As David Kilcullen would argue, the most successful of these groups are the ones that manage to emulate the full spectrum of services and roles of the traditional state. These are few and far between and, despite their claims of establishing Calipahtes, both Boko Haram and IS are far from functioning as states in their own rights. Both groups rule by violence and fanaticism, and it will be their downfall in the end. Boko Haram may have been eclipsed by IS, but we must not forget that their campaign has claimed the lives of thousands and the group will have to be dealt with. Sooner rather than later.
