The Franco-German Brigade: The new model of European defence ?

Between 6th and 22nd March, the Franco-German Brigade successfully completed Exercise Feldberg 13, the Brigade's annual exercise. Conducted in Saxony this year, the objectives of the exercise were to reinforce inter-operability of German and French elements both at the staff and unit level of the Brigade. The exercise was designed as a tactical free terrain deployment in the framework of initial entry force operations. By all accounts the exercise went well. It should have done: the Franco-German Brigade has been doing this every year for the past 20 years. The trouble is the Brigade has never been engaged in a true joint operations deployment. Why is that ?

First of all, a little history 

The roots of the Franco-German Brigade can be traced back to the signing of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. The Treaty aimed to "reset" French and West German relations and consolidate the political efforts of the newly created EEC (European Economic Community). The Treaty was signed by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. It was seen as a step in the right direction to heal the wounds caused by the animosity between the two nations dating back centuries and which culminated in the horror of World War 2.  

The Brigade itself was created on the 2nd of October 1989. It followed the spirit of the 1963 Treaty, being built upon 4 guiding principles: reconciliation, solidarity, fraternity and cooperation. On the ground, the Brigade is a combined arms unit fulfilling the role of a light armoured brigade. Composed of around 5,000 personnel, its headquarters are currently based in Müllheim, Germany, but its garrisons are based in both France and Germany. The leadership rotates between a German and French officers. The Franco-German Brigade is unique in the world: a combined armed unit under bi-national command. It's creation was no small feat, and many sceptics spoke out saying that the Brigade was a political totem, and that combining forces of two different armies, with their own distinct materiel and doctrines, to fight as a cohesive unit would be impossible. Yet it endures 24 years on. 

At the European level, the Franco-German Brigade constitutes the heart of Eurocorp and is also a critical component of the European rapid reaction forces. The main prerogative of the Brigade is to be deployed in places where France and Germany would also deploy troops - for example as part of SFOR and KFOR, as well as the ISAF in Afghanistan.

Deployed yes, but not together

Whilst elements of the Brigade were deployed in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan, most of these elements were deployed alongside their national counterparts, not as the unified brigade they make up. Most recently, in Afghanistan, French and German troops were deployed to administer completely different regions of the country. The only time when the Brigade constituent regiments operate together tends to be on exercises. This has led to the rather facetious monniker as the "Military Drill World Champions". 

The problem with a the concept of a bi-national fighting force is not military. By all accounts, the Brigade operates well as a whole: the problems are political and legal. France and Germany have different foreign policy attitudes and legal systems. Although fighting together, the French and German regiments have to abide by their own rules of engagement shaped by their respective nation's legal system. For the Brigade to fight as a whole, cohesive unit, France and Germany would have to agree to a common legal operational framework that would satisfy both nations. On top of that, France and Germany would have to agree to a joint deployment in the first place. No small task considering the two countries diverging foreign policy postures. 

So were the sceptics right? Is this just a political symbol?  

If judged by its operational history, perhaps. So far only elements of the Brigade have been deployed, all three times under NATO mandate and alongside their national counterparts, not as the bilateral force is was meant to be. 

Nevertheless the Brigade has shown that the concept from a military standpoint can work - and a unified European defence policy is still in its infancy. However tightening defence budgets around Europe are starting to shape new thinking around European levels of defence co-operation. Case in point: the bilateral agreements between France and Britain in 2010. 

Even if the Franco-German Brigade is just a symbol, it's a strong one. It is proof that old wounds and rivalries can be put aside and perhaps shows us that the future of European defence lies not in a grand policy consensus, but smaller bilateral agreements which allow for more flexibility in deployment and implementation. 

Exercise Foal Eagle: the spark that could reignite the Korean War

Since 1997, every year around March, the combined forces of the US and the South Korea engage in one of the largest military exercise in the world: Foal Eagle. And every year, without fail, the exercise provokes condemnation and sabre-rattling rhetoric from North Korea.

The threat of a showdown between two nuclear capable nations is never an enticing prospect, but this year's round of tensions still originate from Foal Eagle, same as almost every year. So why does North Korea get so riled up about a war game happening in the neighbouring country and, more importantly, why do the US and South Korea keep having it if they know it will provoke anger from North Korea? 

The key goal of Foal Eagle is a show of force to demonstrate the US-South Korean resolve to deter the re-emergence of war in the Korean peninsula and also to improve joint operations capabilities in case of war. Foal Eagle is purely defensive in nature - comprising rear area security and stability operations, onward movement of critical assets to the forward area, special operations, ground manoeuvres, amphibious operations, combat air operations, maritime action group operations and counter special operations forces exercises. 

From the US-South Korean perspective, these exercises have two recurring benefits. Firstly, they strengthen mutual ties, providing the South Koreans with reassurances that they understandably seek in dealing with their belligerent neighbour. Secondly, the exercises act as a deterrent, demonstrating to North Korea that if they ever decide to invade again, the US and South Korea will be ready for them. And, combined with sanctions, they contribute to the ratcheting up of pressure to bring North Korea to the nuclear negotiating table. 

So much for Western calculations, but how does North Korea see things? One little-reported factor is that isolated paranoid regimes have long memories and that this can distort otherwise rational calculations. In 1950, the North Koreans successfully disguised their troop movements towards the South as exercises, up until the point when they began crossing the 38th parallel. It’s quite possible that at some level the North Koreans believe that Foal Eagle is US and South Korea trying to pull the same trick on them. This fear may well be exacerbated by the large naval and amphibious aspect of Foal Eagle: many North Korean generals served during the Korean war and probably remember McArthur's landing at Inchon - which resulted in the rapid fallback of North Korean forces almost to the Chinese border.

The general consensus is that the North Korean chest-beating every time Foal Eagle takes place is intended for domestic consumption. Case in point: Kim Jong Un is young and was promoted through the ranks of the army by virtue of his late father, Kim Jong Il, rather than having earned these promotions. (Incidentally, Kim Jong Il faced the same problem.) The North Korean military is headed by war veterans who probably don't take to kindly to Kim Jon Un's pampered upbringing. The sabre-rattling is generally geared towards keeping the generals happy, as the army is arguably the most powerful political entity in North Korea. 

This is why America is often comfortable with calling North Korea's bluff. Occasionally the North Koreans will back their threats with actions, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010, but the US counts on the restraint of South Korea not to escalate the situation.

This time around however, we are witnessing a potentially toxic combination of factors - a new leader who's an unknown quantity, enhanced missile (and nuclear?) strike capability and new level of bellicose rhetoric. Events have escalated very quickly, with significant military mobilisation happening on both sides of the DMZ. There is a growing fear that Kim Jong Un may have backed himself into a corner: stand down, rejoin negotiations and risk looking weak in front of the generals or commit to a fight and face annihilation.