Since 1997, every year around
March, the combined forces of the US and the South Korea engage in
one of the largest military exercise in the world: Foal Eagle. And every year,
without fail, the exercise provokes condemnation and sabre-rattling rhetoric
from North Korea.
The
threat of a showdown between two nuclear capable nations is never an enticing
prospect, but this year's round of tensions still originate from Foal Eagle,
same as almost every year. So why does North
Korea get so riled up about a war game happening in
the neighbouring country and, more importantly, why do the US and South Korea keep having it if they know it will
provoke anger from North Korea?
The key goal of Foal Eagle is
a show of force to demonstrate the US-South Korean resolve to deter
the re-emergence of war in the Korean peninsula and also to
improve joint operations capabilities in case of
war. Foal Eagle is purely defensive in nature - comprising rear area security and stability operations, onward
movement of critical assets to the forward area, special operations,
ground manoeuvres, amphibious operations, combat air operations,
maritime action group operations and counter special operations forces
exercises.
From the US-South Korean perspective, these exercises have
two recurring benefits. Firstly, they strengthen mutual ties, providing the South Koreans with
reassurances that they understandably seek in dealing with their belligerent neighbour. Secondly, the exercises act as a deterrent, demonstrating to North Korea that if
they ever decide to invade again, the US and South Korea will be ready for them. And, combined with sanctions, they contribute to the ratcheting up of pressure to bring North Korea to the nuclear negotiating table.
So much for Western calculations, but how does North Korea see things? One little-reported factor is that isolated paranoid regimes have long memories and that this can distort otherwise rational calculations. In 1950, the North Koreans successfully disguised their troop movements towards the South as exercises, up until the point when they began crossing the 38th parallel. It’s quite possible that at some level the North Koreans believe that Foal Eagle is US and South Korea trying to pull the same trick on them. This fear may well be exacerbated by the large naval and amphibious aspect of Foal Eagle: many North Korean generals served during the Korean war and probably remember McArthur's landing at Inchon - which resulted in the rapid fallback of North Korean forces almost to the Chinese border.
The general consensus is that the North Korean chest-beating every time Foal Eagle takes place is intended for domestic consumption. Case in point: Kim Jong Un is young and was promoted through the ranks of the army by virtue of his late father, Kim Jong Il, rather than having earned these promotions. (Incidentally, Kim Jong Il faced the same problem.) The North Korean military is headed by war veterans who probably don't take to kindly to Kim Jon Un's pampered upbringing. The sabre-rattling is generally geared towards keeping the generals happy, as the army is arguably the most powerful political entity in North Korea.
The general consensus is that the North Korean chest-beating every time Foal Eagle takes place is intended for domestic consumption. Case in point: Kim Jong Un is young and was promoted through the ranks of the army by virtue of his late father, Kim Jong Il, rather than having earned these promotions. (Incidentally, Kim Jong Il faced the same problem.) The North Korean military is headed by war veterans who probably don't take to kindly to Kim Jon Un's pampered upbringing. The sabre-rattling is generally geared towards keeping the generals happy, as the army is arguably the most powerful political entity in North Korea.
This is why America is often comfortable with
calling North Korea's bluff. Occasionally the North Koreans will back
their threats with actions, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010, but the
US counts on the restraint of South Korea not to escalate the situation.
This time around however, we are witnessing a potentially toxic combination of factors - a new leader who's an unknown quantity, enhanced missile (and nuclear?) strike capability and new level of bellicose rhetoric. Events have escalated very quickly, with significant military mobilisation happening on both sides of the DMZ. There is a growing fear that Kim Jong Un may have backed himself into a corner: stand down, rejoin negotiations and risk looking weak in front of the generals or commit to a fight and face annihilation.
This time around however, we are witnessing a potentially toxic combination of factors - a new leader who's an unknown quantity, enhanced missile (and nuclear?) strike capability and new level of bellicose rhetoric. Events have escalated very quickly, with significant military mobilisation happening on both sides of the DMZ. There is a growing fear that Kim Jong Un may have backed himself into a corner: stand down, rejoin negotiations and risk looking weak in front of the generals or commit to a fight and face annihilation.
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