Meanwhile, in the other caliphate...

With the attention of the world focussing on the ongoing air campaign against the Islamic State (a.k.a. ISIL, ISIS or Daesh) in Northern Iraq and Syria, the "other" Caliphate, known as Boko Haram, has decided to grab back some of the limelight. After all, Boko Haram did manage to trigger one of the most star studded Twitter campaigns by kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in the Northern Nigerian city of Chibok, in mid April. It is estimated that Boko Haram still holds around 200 of the girls. It would seem Twitter has its limits.

The latest video depicts the movement’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, proclaiming to still being alive, despite claims by Nigerian Security Services back in late September. This is the third time that Shekau (if indeed it is him) has been declared dead by the Nigerian authorities, the last allegations occurring in 2009 and 2013. Speaking in a mixture of Arabic and Hausa, Shekau expatiated how Boko Haram was to lead the caliphate (essentially territory controlled by the group in Northern Nigeria and the border regions with Cameroon, Chad and Niger), as well as describing the various forms of punishment to be doled out according to Sharia law in said caliphate. 

Boko Haram was the first organisation to swear loyalty to the Islamic State led by Abu Bakr al-Bagdahdi, back in mid July. Boko Haram later then declared its own caliphate on the 24th of Augustafter capturing the town of Gwoza in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram shares many similarities with the Islamic State. Both groups groups are considered to be part of the Salafist movement and preach strict practice of Islam and the uncompromising application of Sharia law in the territories they control. Both have taken advantage of porous borders regions, incompetent and corrupt local governments and Western complacency to expand their influence and territorial gains. Both have made the news headlines around the world for the acts of extreme violence committed against civilian and military personnel that are unfortunate enough to get caught in their web. And finally both organisations reject post-colonial nation-state boundaries, which in the case of Boko Haram, means threatening at least four nations at the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa. 

However the two Caliphates have differences both in origins and capabilities. Though both groups have bolstered their military capabilities by seizing military hardware from fleeing (often numerically superior) government troops, Boko Haram neither posses the same manpower (thought to hover between 5000- 10000 men) nor financial means to sustain itself the same way the IS does. Boko Haram's successes are probably more due to military incompetence on behalf of Nigeria than actual martial prowess. A case in point is the group’s more mediocre performances during incursions in neighbouring Cameroon and Chad. 

Initially founded by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram fell under the leadership of Shekau in 2009, after Yusuf was shot dead by Nigerian policeman. Shekau is often credited for being responsible for the increasingly hard-line and violent stance taken by the sect since he first joined them in 2003 and became one of Yusuf's most trusted lieutenants. Whilst little is known about Shekau himself (his nationality and even date of birth are debated), he quickly gained a reputation for violence and fanaticism. Deemed to lack the religious education, the oratory skill or the restraint of his mentor, he assumed command by spreading terror both within and without the organisation. Under his five year leadership, Boko Haram began targeting civilians and local security forces, as well as reinforcing its ties with Islamic groups operating in the Sahel and Sahara - such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine. Its ties with regional and international movements and its capabilities to operate with relative impunity in Northern Nigeria, Southern Chad and Niger and North-Western Cameroon make Boko Haram a truly significant threat for both regional stability and Western interests. 

So what are the solutions ? Like all asymmetrical threats, the answer may be in part military but it has to go beyond that. Although arguably one of the best funded militaries in Africa, the Nigerian's army performance has been frankly lacking. Stories of troops fleeing in the face of smaller numbers of insurgents abound. Further allegations of crimes being committed by Nigerian security forces and local "self defence" militias have not helped. Like all insurgent groups, Boko Haram has been both enabled and marginalised by corrupt and incompetent local authorities. Non state armed groups like Boko Haram tend to fill the void left by inadequate governance by governments. It seems however that the Nigerians at least have understood, and the authorities have decided to adopt a "softer" approach, trying to win back local (mostly Muslim) communities in the North, potential recruits for Boko Haram, by reaffirming the role of local administrations and trying to undo the harm created by the local self defence militias. This is counter-insurgency 101 and of course the military has a role in all this: clearing and securing territory from the insurgents, enabling local authorities to reconstitute themselves and assert state authority and services. 

However, from an international standpoint, Boko Haram remains a mostly African problem. Though Nigeria's plight received attention after the highly mediatised kidnapping of the 276 schoolgirls, external help came mainly from the deployment of "experts" and access to intelligence and surveillance data in order to help with the rescue of the hostages. And the West seems far more preoccupied with the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The major Western military power in the region, France, has military presence in both Niger and Chad, however this is to support France's ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the Sahara and the Sahel. If anything, the current situation in Libya means that the French are looking to shift their dispositions North rather than South. The French are also heavily involved in the Central African Republic. Simply put, France does not really have the capabilities at the moment to offer significant military aid to Nigeria. What the West can offer is training and advice as well as ISTAR capabilities to Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. It is up to these nations to concert their efforts if Boko Haram is to be defeated. 

Arguably the greatest weakness of Boko Haram and IS are their own brutal methods that have exponentially increased as both groups have moved into an expansionist mindset. Key to the defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the "ancestor" or IS, was their brutal behaviour towards the Sunni communities that harboured them. The Americans were able to capitalise on the growing sense of rejection thanks to the surge. American troops were not only able to re-take and hold ground from the insurgents, the protection they provided to the Sunni communities laid the ground for the "reconciliation" of these communities with the Iraqi State. Dubbed the "Anbar Awakening", this event can provide a viable model for Nigerian efforts. By all accounts, Boko Haram are as brutal as IS towards the civilians they rule over, and Shekau's fanatical "mad dog" behaviour has driven deep divisions within the group. Boko Haram is a symptom of an illness that has been plaguing the developing world for decades. Ethnic tensions and poor governance have created breeding grounds for armed groups to take the place of governments. As David Kilcullen would argue, the most successful of these groups are the ones that manage to emulate the full spectrum of services and roles of the traditional state. These are few and far between and, despite their claims of establishing Calipahtes, both Boko Haram and IS are far from functioning as states in their own rights. Both groups rule by violence and fanaticism, and it will be their downfall in the end. Boko Haram may have been eclipsed by IS, but we must not forget that their campaign has claimed the lives of thousands and the group will have to be dealt with. Sooner rather than later. 

Hardly a breeze: selling the Mistral to Russia

On Monday 30th June, after a few days’ delay, the RFS Smolny docked in Saint Nazaire, France. This marked another crucial milestone in France's controversial programme to sell two of its Mistral Class amphibious assault ships to the Russian Navy.

Referred to by the French as a Projection and Command Vessel, the Mistral can be host to 16 helicopters (medium lift or gunship), 70 vehicles including up to 13 main battle tanks (or 40 is fully loaded with MBTs), 450 soldiers and 69 hospital beds, alongside all the necessary command and control facilities from which to conduct its many missions. Three currently serve in the French Navy (their flagship the Mistral, followed by the Tonnerre and the Dixmude) have participated in numerous missions from Lebanon, Libya, Ivory Coast and Mali to name a few. The Russian Navy expressed interest in the platform and a deal was announced back in 2011 for two ships, adapted to Russian specifications.  

The 400 Russian sailors aboard the Smolny (a training ship) will begin formal training on their new vessel, christened the Vladivostok, under the supervision of the Défense Conseil International (DCI), an agency specialising in training and handover of French military equipment to foreign customers. The second vessel, ironically dubbed the Sevastopol, is still under final assembly in France.

The deal came under immediate criticism from the US first and foremost, followed by the Baltic and Scandinavian states, always wary of possible Russian aggression. US Republicans had been vocal in opposing the sale of such highly advanced platform to Russia since 2009, following a statement by Admiral Vyssotski a year earlier that the possession of such a platform would have had allowed him to project forces in 40 mins rather than 26 hours during the Russian intervention of South Ossetia in 2008. This statement, although hyperbole, helped fuel the idea that modern arms sales would enable Russia to further destabilise its border regions. Further concerns were expressed about NATO technology and protocols potentially falling into Russian hands: asimilar criticism was levelled at Turkey (the second largest NATO partner) after it expressed the desire to purchase Chinese made SAM systems earlier in the year.

Fast forward and the Ukrainian crisis has once again brought the sale of the Mistral to the fore. Joining the rest of the West in condemnation of Russia's actions, the French have yet to firmly announce the cancellation of the contract -  to the renewed disapproval of the US. And in a move that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, Polands' own Defence Minister has publicly declared his opposition to the sale.

However successive French governments have held firm.

Cancelling the contract now would incur large penalties for the French state and put its reputation at risk. The French arms industry is the fourth largest in France and is still highly dependent on French acquisitions, especially the land component. Exports account for around a third revenue, and with dwindling French defence budgets, the industry is increasingly looking outwards. France is the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, so a cancellation of such an important, high profile contract would be an unwelcome blow to its standing. Something the Russians have picked up quite astutely. Following a visit to Washington by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who was questioned regarding the sale, Rosobronexport, the Russian state-owned arms export agency, made a statement declaring that the Mistral acquisition process was on track and praising the reliability of their French partners. And more recently, President Putin declared that he believed the record fine imposed by US authorities on the French bank, BNP Paribas, was blackmail to get the French to back off and cancel the contract. A statement that has no doubt caused significant irritation in Washington and Paris. Probably because there is some truth to it. 

Some have suggested that France sell or lease the two ships to other other NATO members, or even to NATO itself, though there has been little appetite for either idea so far. But do these ships actually pose a significant threat to European security if they were to fall in Russian hands? Probably not. Or at least they would not significantly upset the current balance we see today.

Firstly, only the Sevastopol will be deployed in Europe (the name is the give-away). The other ship will be deployed to the Pacific fleet to address China's and Japan's growing assertiveness in relation to the various ongoing territorial disputes there. Disregarding Admiral Vyssotski's rather grandiose statement, the real added value of these ships to the Russians lies not in their amphibious assault capabilities (which they already possess), but rather in their command and control capabilities. These ships are intended as stopgaps anyway, whilst the domestic Russian industry matures enough to build their own amphibious assault ships. Cancelling the contract would simply delay the inevitable, not  prevent it altogether. The sale of the Mistrals is simply a reality that the Baltic States (and NATO) will have to come to terms with. Perhaps sooner than anticipated. 

Russia and the Crimea: Protecting minorities or protecting the Black Sea Fleet ?

The events currently unfolding in Ukraine are troubling and potentially extremely volatile. As the time of writing, it is estimated that around 2000 Russian troops are now present in Crimea, occupying key strategic locations. The Ukrainian interim government has now declared military mobilisation and is accusing the Russians of breaching Ukraine's territorial integrity. Tensions are running high. 

Russia is claiming that the mobilisation of troops is designed to help protect the Russian speaking minorities heavily present in the Crimea, but make no mistake - this is just a pretext being exploited by the Russian government in the wake of the Maidan movement in Kiev. Any student of history would tell you that the Russians don't exactly have a great track record when it comes to the protection of minorities (both within its own borders and without). The true interest of the Russians lies in Sevastopol. 

The great city of Sevastopol is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the Russians would be loth to lose control of it. Ever since the great power ambitions of the Tsars, access to the world’s ocean has been a primary concern of Russian strategic pursuits all the way through the Soviet period and into the Russian Federation. Russia ability to project power and safeguard its interest is directly linked to its ability for its military and merchant navies to navigate every corner of the world’s oceans. Naval power is just as important today as it was in the 18th Century. Indeed Sevastopol and the Black Fleet are Russia's only significant access to the Mediterranean (discounting the small Russian logistical port in Syria). And even then, their access was hampered by the Bosphorus Straight, controlled by Turkey, a major NATO member, and before that by the Ottoman Empire. Russian access to the Atlantic is also problematic, with the North Sea ports being difficult to navigate in winter and access to the Atlantic being blocked off by primarily by the Turks, but also the British in Gibraltar.

With these strategic considerations in mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant challenge to Russian ambitions in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Could a new independent Ukraine be trusted to safeguard Russian naval interests? If Russian involvement in Ukrainian domestic affairs during the last two decades or so are any indication, then the answer is no. And present circumstances may have proven them right. The Russians initially signed a lease with Ukraine, granting them joint access to Sevastopol (alongside the Ukrainian navy). This lease was initially supposed to expire in 2017, but was extended to 2042 by then President Viktor Yanukovych. The same Yanukovych who is on the run after being "deposed" by the Maidan movement. The current opposition in the new interim government has threatened to rescind the lease extension, which would kick the Black Sea Fleet out of Ukraine in 2017.  

Not only is Russia’s tenuous hold of their naval power in the Western hemisphere under threat, but Ukraine remains the last buffer zone in the West against European (EU integration) and American (NATO expansion) influence. A pro-European Ukraine would mark the death knell of Russian influence in Europe. This imperialistic consideration survived the Soviet Union and is still very present today, though obviously not unique to Russia. In many ways Russia’s leaders today are very much products of the Cold War.   

So what now? It is clear that the Russians are employing the same strategy that they did during the Georgian conflict in 2008. Under pretext of protecting minorities, the Russians are undergoing significant military build-up in foreign territory. Perhaps in the hopes of goading the Ukrainians into attacking first, as the Georgians did. Like Georgia this would increase Russian legitimacy and severely restrict any form of assistance Ukraine could receive from the West. No-one in Europe and America wants a direct military conflict with the Russians; after all we spent four decades trying to avoid doing so. This sentiment is perhaps best echoed in the weakness of President Obama’s statement yesterday regarding the situation.  

It is clear though that the claim of protecting the Russian minorities in the Crimea is just a pretext to justify Russia’s military build-up. The key objective here is Sevastopol, a key infrastructure to support Russia world power ambitions. Geography has always been a significant hurdle for Russian strategic ambitions and they will not let anything threaten their hold on warm water ports. Whether this is accomplished through the annexation of Crimea or through more peaceful means remains to be seen. 

Rising Sun?

The recent announcement that Japan is increasing its defence budget for the first time in 10 years was predictably met by disapproval from their Chinese neighbours. 


This increase in budget is designed to fund a new shopping spree by the Japanese Self Defence Forces, including drones, VF-22 Ospreys, Aegis Destroyers, amphibious vehicles and new submarines as well as the yet unreleased F-35 A joint strike fighter. This follows the recent launch in August of of the JDS Izumo, a so-called "helicopter destroyer", by the Japanese Self Defence Navy - their largest warship since the Second World War. A point that the Chinese were quick to pick up on, arguing that the huge ship could be converted into a fully fledged aircraft carrier (the Izumo is only 20m shorter than the French Charles de Gaulle). 

All of this has helped stoke the flames of China and Japan's territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Isles in the South China Sea. China has many other unresolved territorial claims in the Yellow, South China and East China Seas, but what's so significant about this dispute in particular? 

The answer is that Japan is being increasingly assertive in providing for its own security and pushing the limits of their own post-war Peace Constitution, imposed by the US in 1945. This was designed to ensure that Japan would never again possess the ability to project power abroad (read invade its neighbours again). But under Shinzo Abe, Japan is re-evaluating its security role in the region and looking both to increase its military self-reliance and reduce its dependency on the US. 

Hence Japan's latest shopping list, which would provide Japan with power projection capabilities that it has not possessed until now, despite fielding the second largest navy in the Pacific. Shinzo Abe has himself called for changes to the Constitution to make this possible. Intriguingly, the US seem to have shifted their position too - having been the prime architects of the military neutering of Japan in 1945, they are now being conspicuously silent.  

Although direct military confrontation between Japan and the PRC seems unlikely, the current Cold War style stand-off does raise some interesting questions about the future of security in Asia. The rise of nationalism in both China and Japan will no doubt escalate tensions further, potentially leading to an arms race in Asia (the region is already the fastest-growing in terms of defence spending). Should that happen, people tend to look to the US to maintain the status quo - but how long will that last if America continues its seemingly unconditional support of Japanese military expansionism, thus backing the Chinese into a dangerous corner?


Despite pledges of Japanese aid towards other ASEAN countries, it is unclear yet how Japan's renewed nationalistic rhetoric and posturing will be accepted elsewhere. Other Asian nations may well be afraid of China's military expansionism, but that does not signify they are ready to accept Japan as the key Asian alternative. The experience of Japanese nationalism has left its mark on Asia, just as German nationalism did in Europe, and many have not forgiven or forgotten the Japanese for their actions during colonial rule (a feeling exacerbated perhaps by Japan's own half-hearted mea culpas on the matter). 

The A400 M Atlas: The New Heart of European Airlift Capabilities ?

Well it's almost here, sort of. The Bastille Day air show was spearheaded by an A400m (MSN7) escorted by a French air force Rafale and a German Eurofighter Typhoon over the Champs Elysée. MSN7 is still sporting it's Airbus Military registration but is due to enter in the French Air Force in the following days , with MSN8 entering service later in September. 

The program is 4 years late and significantly over budget but it marks an important milestone in European Airlift capabilities. The aircraft is due to be adopted by the French, German, British and Spanish Air Forces. These aircraft are severely needed in the French and German air forces where the airlift capabilities are assured by the relatively small C-160s and C-130s. The British opted to procure 8  C-17s to help meet their operational demands. However smaller, the A-400M has certain capabilities that the bigger jet powered C-17 does not and therefore remained attractive to the RAF.

Events such as Operation Serval demonstrated the need to possess significant Airlift capabilities in order to troops and materiel quickly in areas where access to the sea may not exist geographically or prove to be geo-politically impractical. During Operation Serval, the French Air Force could only provide 25% of the total airlift demand that was required. A further 25% was provided by Allied nations. But a stunning 50% was provided by a private Ukrainian firm aboard its massive An 124s. This solution is both costly and limiting in terms of strategic flexibility. 

Despite it's development hiccups, the A400M Atlas makes a lot of sense. In terms of capabilities, it sits in between the old but reliable C-130 Hercules and the much larger C-17 Globemaster 3s. It would also provide a common platform for Europe's major military forces to train and inter-operate on, reinforcing the feasibility of  the projection of joint European Forces around the globe. As the Americans scale back and refocus their assets to the Pacific,  the major European powers can no longer rely on the might of the US Air Force to provide the same amount of support to its allies as it used to. 

The A400M imposes itself as breath of fresh air to individual countries and their foreign military ambitions but may also serve coalesce the feasibility of pan-European operations, as they become less reliant on US support (and thus approval). All that remains is to see whether the A400M actual conforms to its required performances. 

The JSF: too big to fail ?

In March of this year, a Pentagon report on the F35 leaked, highlighting yet more difficulties and problems facing the Joint Strike Fighter program - and adding more fire to the debate raging around what is considered to be the most expensive weapons development program in history. 

The report highlighted problems with the new HMD (Helmet Mounted Display) blurring the pilots' vision, problems with aft visibility, lagging software development meaning that night time testing and advanced manoeuvres are still off the testing table and issues with the aircraft's ability to operate in cold weather (a serious issue for the Norwegians and the Canadians). This follows a grounding of the entire test fleet after cracks were found in the turbine blades of one of the aircraft. 

The program is thought to be around 7 years behind schedule and its cost has risen by 70% since 2001, averaging around $373 billion dollars. Yet the program endures. Here is why. 

First off, what is the JSF all about ? 

The JSF concept was borne out of the realisation of the relative inefficiency of aircraft development by the US. Essentially the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy would develop their own aircraft independently from each other based around each branches' specific needs and operational requirements. This, coupled with constantly rising costs of development as the hardware gets more and more advanced, led to the conclusion that the next generation fighters of American fighters would have to be developed co-jointly with all branches of the US military in mind. And thus was borne the JSF program. 

The F35 Lightning II (named in honour of the P38 Lightning of World War 2 fame) was designed as a family of single seat, single engined, stealth, fifth generation multi-role fighters whose airframe could be declined into three main variants to fit the operational requirements of the Air Force, Navy and Marines. The F35 A would replace the Air Force's F16s and A-10s, the F35B with STOVL (Short Take Off and Vertical Landing) capabilities would replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier IIs, and the F35C would replace the Navy's F/A 18s. The idea is that the three versions would use many core parts (such as radar, combat software etc...) in order for them to be assembled on the same line, greatly reducing logistical costs. 

On top of that, the program was to be jointly developed by eight other countries (though the US would provide the majority of the funding). The partner countries are the UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Canada, Australia, Turkey and the Netherlands. In recent years, Israel and Japan have also showed interest in the program. This international partnership would help alleviate the cost and boost interoperability. The final contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin and the first F35 flew in 2006. The aircraft is not expected to enter service until after 2016.

So what is going wrong ? 

There are a number of reasons why the project has hit so many hiccups along the way. The aircraft would incorporate many technological advancements that are fairly new and thus need to be tested alongside the aircraft. Many fingers point towards lagging software development for the aircraft's complex electronic suites as one of the points holding the testing back. Others point to significant problems with the airframe. The one-size-fits-all approach is compromising the plane on core capabilities. Each setback translates into delays and rising costs. Aircraft development is fraught with hiccups during the development phase: these are highly complex machines combining myriad different systems to allow the whole thing to work. 

Suffice to say, people are questioning the whole program more and more. With unit costs predicted to rise to around $200 million a pop, what started as a program to save money has become the most expensive weapons development program in US history. 

So why isn't the whole thing being scrapped ? 

On paper the JSF is a smart move and provides a huge leap forward over the current designs in service. The JSF would provide the worlds first true 5th generation multi-role fighter. The fighter would provide the crux of US military power from 2020 onwards. And the US is planning on purchasing 2,400 of the them. 

Simply put the US and the other partner countries have put almost all their eggs into one basket and there is no plan B. The program must succeed. Yes, the combination of ballooning development costs and shrinking defence budgets have casts doubts over the feasibility of the whole thing - and Canada, Australia and Italy have already come out saying that they will probably purchase fewer planes than initially planned -  but so much money has been spent at this point that scrapping the whole thing is no longer feasible. 

On a smaller micro scale, in the US alone the program involves over 1,300 suppliers in 45 different states, assuring over 133, 000 jobs. Even more if you factor in the job creation in the 8 other partner countries. Many Congressmen and Senators who criticise the program have nevertheless never called for the JSF to be aborted. Even the very existence of Lockheed Martin, who solely provides for the military, is thought to be at stake. 

Simply put, we have come too far, and the stakes and vested interests too high for it to be cancelled now. The JSF has become too big to fail.  

The Franco-German Brigade: The new model of European defence ?

Between 6th and 22nd March, the Franco-German Brigade successfully completed Exercise Feldberg 13, the Brigade's annual exercise. Conducted in Saxony this year, the objectives of the exercise were to reinforce inter-operability of German and French elements both at the staff and unit level of the Brigade. The exercise was designed as a tactical free terrain deployment in the framework of initial entry force operations. By all accounts the exercise went well. It should have done: the Franco-German Brigade has been doing this every year for the past 20 years. The trouble is the Brigade has never been engaged in a true joint operations deployment. Why is that ?

First of all, a little history 

The roots of the Franco-German Brigade can be traced back to the signing of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. The Treaty aimed to "reset" French and West German relations and consolidate the political efforts of the newly created EEC (European Economic Community). The Treaty was signed by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. It was seen as a step in the right direction to heal the wounds caused by the animosity between the two nations dating back centuries and which culminated in the horror of World War 2.  

The Brigade itself was created on the 2nd of October 1989. It followed the spirit of the 1963 Treaty, being built upon 4 guiding principles: reconciliation, solidarity, fraternity and cooperation. On the ground, the Brigade is a combined arms unit fulfilling the role of a light armoured brigade. Composed of around 5,000 personnel, its headquarters are currently based in Müllheim, Germany, but its garrisons are based in both France and Germany. The leadership rotates between a German and French officers. The Franco-German Brigade is unique in the world: a combined armed unit under bi-national command. It's creation was no small feat, and many sceptics spoke out saying that the Brigade was a political totem, and that combining forces of two different armies, with their own distinct materiel and doctrines, to fight as a cohesive unit would be impossible. Yet it endures 24 years on. 

At the European level, the Franco-German Brigade constitutes the heart of Eurocorp and is also a critical component of the European rapid reaction forces. The main prerogative of the Brigade is to be deployed in places where France and Germany would also deploy troops - for example as part of SFOR and KFOR, as well as the ISAF in Afghanistan.

Deployed yes, but not together

Whilst elements of the Brigade were deployed in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan, most of these elements were deployed alongside their national counterparts, not as the unified brigade they make up. Most recently, in Afghanistan, French and German troops were deployed to administer completely different regions of the country. The only time when the Brigade constituent regiments operate together tends to be on exercises. This has led to the rather facetious monniker as the "Military Drill World Champions". 

The problem with a the concept of a bi-national fighting force is not military. By all accounts, the Brigade operates well as a whole: the problems are political and legal. France and Germany have different foreign policy attitudes and legal systems. Although fighting together, the French and German regiments have to abide by their own rules of engagement shaped by their respective nation's legal system. For the Brigade to fight as a whole, cohesive unit, France and Germany would have to agree to a common legal operational framework that would satisfy both nations. On top of that, France and Germany would have to agree to a joint deployment in the first place. No small task considering the two countries diverging foreign policy postures. 

So were the sceptics right? Is this just a political symbol?  

If judged by its operational history, perhaps. So far only elements of the Brigade have been deployed, all three times under NATO mandate and alongside their national counterparts, not as the bilateral force is was meant to be. 

Nevertheless the Brigade has shown that the concept from a military standpoint can work - and a unified European defence policy is still in its infancy. However tightening defence budgets around Europe are starting to shape new thinking around European levels of defence co-operation. Case in point: the bilateral agreements between France and Britain in 2010. 

Even if the Franco-German Brigade is just a symbol, it's a strong one. It is proof that old wounds and rivalries can be put aside and perhaps shows us that the future of European defence lies not in a grand policy consensus, but smaller bilateral agreements which allow for more flexibility in deployment and implementation.