The A400 M Atlas: The New Heart of European Airlift Capabilities ?

Well it's almost here, sort of. The Bastille Day air show was spearheaded by an A400m (MSN7) escorted by a French air force Rafale and a German Eurofighter Typhoon over the Champs Elysée. MSN7 is still sporting it's Airbus Military registration but is due to enter in the French Air Force in the following days , with MSN8 entering service later in September. 

The program is 4 years late and significantly over budget but it marks an important milestone in European Airlift capabilities. The aircraft is due to be adopted by the French, German, British and Spanish Air Forces. These aircraft are severely needed in the French and German air forces where the airlift capabilities are assured by the relatively small C-160s and C-130s. The British opted to procure 8  C-17s to help meet their operational demands. However smaller, the A-400M has certain capabilities that the bigger jet powered C-17 does not and therefore remained attractive to the RAF.

Events such as Operation Serval demonstrated the need to possess significant Airlift capabilities in order to troops and materiel quickly in areas where access to the sea may not exist geographically or prove to be geo-politically impractical. During Operation Serval, the French Air Force could only provide 25% of the total airlift demand that was required. A further 25% was provided by Allied nations. But a stunning 50% was provided by a private Ukrainian firm aboard its massive An 124s. This solution is both costly and limiting in terms of strategic flexibility. 

Despite it's development hiccups, the A400M Atlas makes a lot of sense. In terms of capabilities, it sits in between the old but reliable C-130 Hercules and the much larger C-17 Globemaster 3s. It would also provide a common platform for Europe's major military forces to train and inter-operate on, reinforcing the feasibility of  the projection of joint European Forces around the globe. As the Americans scale back and refocus their assets to the Pacific,  the major European powers can no longer rely on the might of the US Air Force to provide the same amount of support to its allies as it used to. 

The A400M imposes itself as breath of fresh air to individual countries and their foreign military ambitions but may also serve coalesce the feasibility of pan-European operations, as they become less reliant on US support (and thus approval). All that remains is to see whether the A400M actual conforms to its required performances. 

Study of an arms deal: why India favours the Rafale

With the recent news that the negotiations on the adoption of the Rafale as India's MMF (Medium Multi-role Fighter) are moving ahead again, it’s worth asking what considerations might have influenced India's decision-making. Especially considering that the MMF tender is also the largest arms deal of the largest democracy in the world.

Ultimately governments make purchase decisions about multi-million dollar military hardware pretty much the same way that you or I might choose a mobile phone provider or car insurance. Essentially it all boils down to 4 things: performance, cost, customer service and trust.

1. Performance

Q: Does the product meet (or exceed) your requirements?

Let’s start by comparing the two finalists in the Indian MMF tender: the Dassault Rafale (France) and the EADS Eurofighter Typhoon (UK, Germany, Spain and Italy). (I’ll get to the eliminated offerings from the US later on.)

Both the Typhoon and Rafale are delta winged, multi-roled, fourth generation fighters (France was originally part of the Eurofighter programme) designed in the late 70's. To a layman, both aircraft are very similar, but the devil is in the detail.

The Eurofighter arguably has the edge in BVR and WVR (Beyond Visual Range and Within Visual Range) air-to-air engagement capabilities. However this does not play in its favour in terms of the Indian tender as the Indians already have a superb air-to-air machine in the form of the Russian Su-30 MIK (reportedly more advanced than the Su-35 Flanker-E in operation in the Russian air force).  

Where the Rafale has the upper hand is that it is considered to be an Omni-role fighter rather than the Multi-role Typhoon. It means that the aircraft was designed to perform various missions at the same time. Multi-role aircraft can be outfitted for various missions but often can only conduct one or two at a time. During the Libyan bombing campaign, the French operated Rafales in pairs, switching from observation to strike to aerial area denial at a moment’s notice. Whereas UK Royal Air Force often deployed 2 types of aircraft simultaneously, the Rafale means that you can perform the same missions with half the number of aircraft. 

Other advantages include a navalised version of the Rafale already in operation in the French navy (important to the Indians, who want to develop their own aircraft carriers), the ability to carry AM 39 Exocet anti-ship missiles as well as nuclear cruise missiles and finally the fact that the Rafale is compatible with French-made munitions already in use in the Indian Air Force on their Mirages (the predecessor of the Rafale), greatly simplifying logistics.

2. Cost

Q: Does the product offer good value for money?

It’s been suggested that the Rafale is being offered 5 to 6 million dollars per unit cheaper than the Typhoon. Were that the case, it’s rumoured that Dassault would effectively be foregoing any profit on the deal. If so, the price would be unbeatable.

3. Customer service

Q: How good is the after-sales service?

Germany (one of the 4 partner countries developing the Eurofighter) has been a more important aviation partner for India, helping to develop a native helicopter programme in recent years. Germany's standing is also helped by the fact that many members of India’s ruling class have been educated there and the German political model is often drawn for inspiration in India. However recent German flakiness in terms of technology transfers - and the ever-looming constraint that German law requires them to cease the supply of weapons and spares to their partners if they were to engage in a war - make Germany too unreliable a defence partner in the eyes of the Indians. 

Conversely France and Russia (India’s premier defence partner) have the advantage of not being subject to national or international arms embargoes when dealing with other states, so the supply chain would almost always be guaranteed. 

4. Trust

Q: Do you trust the product (or rather the people who make it)?  

As with consumer goods, trust is largely earned by getting (1) to (3) right. But trust also comes down to more intangible factors – in particular strength of relationship and political will.    

In this context, the Eurofighter is a thorny proposition for the Indians. It is built by a conglomerate of four nations, each with their own separate foreign policies and arms trade laws. Italy and Spain have never sold anything major to India, military-wise. Britain recently sold a batch of training aircraft to India, but the last combat aircraft sold to India was the Jaguar in the 70s. And that was developed 50/50 with France, so Britain and France share the credit for that. 

Here again the Rafale has the edge. The Indian air force has been using French aircraft since the 1950s and since then it has been involved in four major conflicts. The Indians have found the French to be particularly accommodating in terms of logistics and technology transfers – especially when they asked them to help modify their Mirages for use with Russian- and Israeli-made munitions in 1999.

It is this solid trust (or lack thereof) that eliminated the US offerings very quickly. Other than the fact that the American F16s and F/A 18s were not as advanced as their European rivals, the US has been supplying Pakistan (India's perennial enemy). It is also a well known fact that the US sold "incomplete" F16s to Pakistan (they lacked advanced radar), both of these  factors making the US an unreliable partner in the eyes of India. 

In the end, it’s probably trust that will have tipped the balance in France’s favour. A neat reminder that, like consumers, arms buyers want to have warm and cuddly feelings too.

Arming rebels : Playing with fire ?

Last week both the French and British governments announced that they would seek to lift an EU blanket arms embargo on Syria, allowing them to begin supplying opposition forces to Assad's regime with weapons and munitions. The move was backed by US yesterday during a conference by the US Secretary of State John Kerry. However as of right now, Britain and France have yet to convince their Europeans partners, especially Germany, that lifting the embargo would help to stabilise the rapport de force between the various factions fighting in Syria. 

France and Britain's positions are understandable: the war has been raging on for 2 years, it has displaced over 450,000 Syrians and almost triggered a war with neighbouring Turkey. The stakes are high. Assad's regime has much to answer for, including the massacre of civilians by Shabiha militias, but what keeps Western politicians up at night is Syria's extensive arsenal of chemical weapons. Will Assad ever use them against his people? Unlikely since he would probably lose support of Russia and China. But what if the Sunni extremist factions of the rebellion got hold of them? Could they be used against Israel or sold to extremist movements? More likely they could be used in the inevitable retributions that would follow the collapse of the Assad regime.

The history of Syria is marred with tensions between the Sunni majority and the Alawite population, of which the Assad family is part. In the 14th century Alawites were declared enemies of Islam by radical Sunni clerics and the various fatwas issued against them resulted in massacres. The Alawites finally got their own back when Hafez Al-Assad seized power. Originally a Baathist (who strove for the creation of a unified secular state across Arab lands) Al-Assad senior became embroiled in a civil conflict against the Muslim Brotherhood, eventually culminating in the eradication of the Brotherhood at the brutal Battle of Hama in 1982. Since then the Alawites have enjoyed preferential treatment under the Syrian regime, stoking the flames of ancient hatred and resentment against them. Many radical Sunnis still consider them the worst enemies of Islam and it is conceivable that atrocious exactions will befall them if the Assad regime were to collapse.  

So what do Britain and France hope to accomplish by arming the rebels?

Assad is being supported by Russia (as well as Iran and their proxy army Hezbollah, who want to extend Shia influence in the region). The Sunni rebels are being supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar (two Sunni nations). But what about the moderate/secular branch of the rebellion? That is the imbalance that France and Britain want to address. If the Assad regime were to be toppled today, the Sunni rebel factions would be in a clear position of strength. As much as the West wants to see Assad gone, the idea of a radical Sunni Syria, with access to a large stockpile of chemical weapons is not a particularly appealing one. (Especially to Israel.) So by arming the "secular" branch of the rebellion, the French and the British hope to redress the balance of power within the opposition, keeping the radicals in check if the Assad regime were to fall. 

It's an extremely risky proposition though. First of all, arming the rebels would be a breach of international law, as the Russian Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov recently pointed out. It wouldn't be the first time in history that states have armed rebel factions, especially during the Cold War, but this could have serious repercussions for France and Britain in terms of international relations. This could be worsened by the fact that Britain and France would have no control of how the weapons and training they provide would be used in the conflict. It is very possible that in-fightingcould break out between the various rebel factions if the Assad regime were to be deposed. All that France and Britain would have accomplished would then be the extension of the civil war - with all the unpleasant consequences that civil wars tend to have. And the civilians, as usual, would bear the brunt of these consequences. 

Britain and France's proposal is driven by two calculations - one geo-political, the other domestic. Firstly an attempt to break the political deadlock at the international level. Assad enjoys protection and military support from Russia and China. This effectively shields him from direct military intervention by Western powers. As unethical as Russia's support of the Assad regime is, their arms supply are not illegal and there is not much that the US, France and Britain can do about it. This is causing much frustration and arming the rebels is seen as "doing something". The second factor is political opportunism. Things aren't exactly going well domestically for David Cameron and François Hollande, but recent military involvement by the two nations during the Arab Spring have emboldened the two leaders on the international stage and given them a taste for statesmanship.

For the moment Assad has the upper hand. He is in control of 70% of Syria and enjoys the protection of powerful allies. There is very little sign that things could change and arming the rebels is a reckless and short-sighted solution - if you can call it a solution at all. Arming sections of the rebels could bring the conclusion to the conflict sooner, however it is more likely that it would fuel an extension of war in the resulting power vacuum that would inevitably follow the downfall of Bashar Al-Assad. How many more would die or be displaced then?