Last week both the French and British governments
announced that they would seek to lift an EU blanket arms embargo on Syria,
allowing them to begin supplying opposition forces to Assad's regime with
weapons and munitions. The move was backed by US yesterday during
a conference by the US Secretary of State John Kerry. However as of
right now, Britain and France have yet to convince their Europeans partners,
especially Germany, that lifting the embargo would help to stabilise the
rapport de force between the various factions fighting in Syria.
France and Britain's positions are understandable: the
war has been raging on for 2 years, it has displaced over 450,000 Syrians and
almost triggered a war with neighbouring Turkey. The stakes are high.
Assad's regime has much to answer for, including the massacre of civilians by
Shabiha militias, but what keeps Western politicians up at night is
Syria's extensive arsenal of chemical weapons. Will Assad ever use them
against his people? Unlikely since he would probably lose support of Russia and
China. But what if the Sunni extremist factions of the rebellion got hold of them? Could
they be used against Israel or sold to extremist movements? More likely
they could be used in the inevitable retributions that would follow the
collapse of the Assad regime.
The history of Syria is marred with tensions
between the Sunni majority and the Alawite population, of which the Assad family is
part. In the 14th century Alawites were declared enemies of
Islam by radical Sunni clerics and the various fatwas issued against them
resulted in massacres. The Alawites finally got their own back when Hafez
Al-Assad seized power. Originally a Baathist (who strove for the creation of a
unified secular state across Arab lands) Al-Assad senior became
embroiled in a civil conflict against the Muslim Brotherhood,
eventually culminating in the eradication of the Brotherhood at the brutal
Battle of Hama in 1982. Since then the Alawites have enjoyed preferential
treatment under the Syrian regime, stoking the flames of ancient hatred and
resentment against them. Many radical Sunnis still consider them the worst
enemies of Islam and it is conceivable that atrocious exactions will befall
them if the Assad regime were to collapse.
So what do Britain and France hope
to accomplish by arming the rebels?
Assad is being supported by Russia (as well as Iran
and their proxy army Hezbollah, who want to extend Shia influence in the
region). The Sunni rebels are being supported by
Saudi Arabia and Qatar (two Sunni nations). But what about the moderate/secular branch of the rebellion? That is the
imbalance that France and Britain want to address. If the Assad regime were to
be toppled today, the Sunni rebel factions would be in a clear position
of strength. As much as the West wants to see Assad gone, the idea of a
radical Sunni Syria, with access to a large stockpile of chemical weapons is
not a particularly appealing one. (Especially to Israel.) So by arming
the "secular" branch of the rebellion, the French and the British
hope to redress the balance of power within the opposition, keeping
the radicals in check if the Assad regime were to fall.
It's an extremely risky proposition
though. First of all, arming the rebels would be a breach of
international law, as the Russian Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov recently
pointed out. It wouldn't be the first time in history that states
have armed rebel factions, especially during the Cold War, but this could have
serious repercussions for France and Britain in terms of international
relations. This could be worsened by the fact that Britain and France would
have no control of how the weapons and training they provide would be used in
the conflict. It is very possible that in-fightingcould break out between
the various rebel factions if the Assad regime were to be deposed.
All that France and Britain would have accomplished would then be the
extension of the civil war - with all the unpleasant
consequences that civil wars tend to have. And the civilians, as
usual, would bear the brunt of these consequences.
Britain and France's proposal is driven by two
calculations - one geo-political, the other domestic. Firstly an attempt to break the
political deadlock at the international level. Assad enjoys protection and
military support from Russia and China. This effectively shields him
from direct military intervention by Western powers. As unethical as Russia's
support of the Assad regime is, their arms supply are not illegal and
there is not much that the US, France and Britain can do about it. This is
causing much frustration and arming the rebels is seen as "doing
something". The second factor is political opportunism. Things aren't exactly
going well domestically for David Cameron and François Hollande, but
recent military involvement by the two nations during the Arab Spring
have emboldened the two leaders on the international stage and given
them a taste for statesmanship.
For the moment Assad has the upper hand. He is in
control of 70% of Syria and enjoys the protection of powerful allies. There is
very little sign that things could change and arming the rebels is a reckless
and short-sighted solution - if you can call it a solution at all.
Arming sections of the rebels could bring the conclusion to the
conflict sooner, however it is more likely that it would fuel an extension of
war in the resulting power vacuum that would inevitably follow the
downfall of Bashar Al-Assad. How many more would die or be displaced then?
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