Russia and the Crimea: Protecting minorities or protecting the Black Sea Fleet ?

The events currently unfolding in Ukraine are troubling and potentially extremely volatile. As the time of writing, it is estimated that around 2000 Russian troops are now present in Crimea, occupying key strategic locations. The Ukrainian interim government has now declared military mobilisation and is accusing the Russians of breaching Ukraine's territorial integrity. Tensions are running high. 

Russia is claiming that the mobilisation of troops is designed to help protect the Russian speaking minorities heavily present in the Crimea, but make no mistake - this is just a pretext being exploited by the Russian government in the wake of the Maidan movement in Kiev. Any student of history would tell you that the Russians don't exactly have a great track record when it comes to the protection of minorities (both within its own borders and without). The true interest of the Russians lies in Sevastopol. 

The great city of Sevastopol is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the Russians would be loth to lose control of it. Ever since the great power ambitions of the Tsars, access to the world’s ocean has been a primary concern of Russian strategic pursuits all the way through the Soviet period and into the Russian Federation. Russia ability to project power and safeguard its interest is directly linked to its ability for its military and merchant navies to navigate every corner of the world’s oceans. Naval power is just as important today as it was in the 18th Century. Indeed Sevastopol and the Black Fleet are Russia's only significant access to the Mediterranean (discounting the small Russian logistical port in Syria). And even then, their access was hampered by the Bosphorus Straight, controlled by Turkey, a major NATO member, and before that by the Ottoman Empire. Russian access to the Atlantic is also problematic, with the North Sea ports being difficult to navigate in winter and access to the Atlantic being blocked off by primarily by the Turks, but also the British in Gibraltar.

With these strategic considerations in mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant challenge to Russian ambitions in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Could a new independent Ukraine be trusted to safeguard Russian naval interests? If Russian involvement in Ukrainian domestic affairs during the last two decades or so are any indication, then the answer is no. And present circumstances may have proven them right. The Russians initially signed a lease with Ukraine, granting them joint access to Sevastopol (alongside the Ukrainian navy). This lease was initially supposed to expire in 2017, but was extended to 2042 by then President Viktor Yanukovych. The same Yanukovych who is on the run after being "deposed" by the Maidan movement. The current opposition in the new interim government has threatened to rescind the lease extension, which would kick the Black Sea Fleet out of Ukraine in 2017.  

Not only is Russia’s tenuous hold of their naval power in the Western hemisphere under threat, but Ukraine remains the last buffer zone in the West against European (EU integration) and American (NATO expansion) influence. A pro-European Ukraine would mark the death knell of Russian influence in Europe. This imperialistic consideration survived the Soviet Union and is still very present today, though obviously not unique to Russia. In many ways Russia’s leaders today are very much products of the Cold War.   

So what now? It is clear that the Russians are employing the same strategy that they did during the Georgian conflict in 2008. Under pretext of protecting minorities, the Russians are undergoing significant military build-up in foreign territory. Perhaps in the hopes of goading the Ukrainians into attacking first, as the Georgians did. Like Georgia this would increase Russian legitimacy and severely restrict any form of assistance Ukraine could receive from the West. No-one in Europe and America wants a direct military conflict with the Russians; after all we spent four decades trying to avoid doing so. This sentiment is perhaps best echoed in the weakness of President Obama’s statement yesterday regarding the situation.  

It is clear though that the claim of protecting the Russian minorities in the Crimea is just a pretext to justify Russia’s military build-up. The key objective here is Sevastopol, a key infrastructure to support Russia world power ambitions. Geography has always been a significant hurdle for Russian strategic ambitions and they will not let anything threaten their hold on warm water ports. Whether this is accomplished through the annexation of Crimea or through more peaceful means remains to be seen. 

Rising Sun?

The recent announcement that Japan is increasing its defence budget for the first time in 10 years was predictably met by disapproval from their Chinese neighbours. 


This increase in budget is designed to fund a new shopping spree by the Japanese Self Defence Forces, including drones, VF-22 Ospreys, Aegis Destroyers, amphibious vehicles and new submarines as well as the yet unreleased F-35 A joint strike fighter. This follows the recent launch in August of of the JDS Izumo, a so-called "helicopter destroyer", by the Japanese Self Defence Navy - their largest warship since the Second World War. A point that the Chinese were quick to pick up on, arguing that the huge ship could be converted into a fully fledged aircraft carrier (the Izumo is only 20m shorter than the French Charles de Gaulle). 

All of this has helped stoke the flames of China and Japan's territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Isles in the South China Sea. China has many other unresolved territorial claims in the Yellow, South China and East China Seas, but what's so significant about this dispute in particular? 

The answer is that Japan is being increasingly assertive in providing for its own security and pushing the limits of their own post-war Peace Constitution, imposed by the US in 1945. This was designed to ensure that Japan would never again possess the ability to project power abroad (read invade its neighbours again). But under Shinzo Abe, Japan is re-evaluating its security role in the region and looking both to increase its military self-reliance and reduce its dependency on the US. 

Hence Japan's latest shopping list, which would provide Japan with power projection capabilities that it has not possessed until now, despite fielding the second largest navy in the Pacific. Shinzo Abe has himself called for changes to the Constitution to make this possible. Intriguingly, the US seem to have shifted their position too - having been the prime architects of the military neutering of Japan in 1945, they are now being conspicuously silent.  

Although direct military confrontation between Japan and the PRC seems unlikely, the current Cold War style stand-off does raise some interesting questions about the future of security in Asia. The rise of nationalism in both China and Japan will no doubt escalate tensions further, potentially leading to an arms race in Asia (the region is already the fastest-growing in terms of defence spending). Should that happen, people tend to look to the US to maintain the status quo - but how long will that last if America continues its seemingly unconditional support of Japanese military expansionism, thus backing the Chinese into a dangerous corner?


Despite pledges of Japanese aid towards other ASEAN countries, it is unclear yet how Japan's renewed nationalistic rhetoric and posturing will be accepted elsewhere. Other Asian nations may well be afraid of China's military expansionism, but that does not signify they are ready to accept Japan as the key Asian alternative. The experience of Japanese nationalism has left its mark on Asia, just as German nationalism did in Europe, and many have not forgiven or forgotten the Japanese for their actions during colonial rule (a feeling exacerbated perhaps by Japan's own half-hearted mea culpas on the matter). 

The A400 M Atlas: The New Heart of European Airlift Capabilities ?

Well it's almost here, sort of. The Bastille Day air show was spearheaded by an A400m (MSN7) escorted by a French air force Rafale and a German Eurofighter Typhoon over the Champs Elysée. MSN7 is still sporting it's Airbus Military registration but is due to enter in the French Air Force in the following days , with MSN8 entering service later in September. 

The program is 4 years late and significantly over budget but it marks an important milestone in European Airlift capabilities. The aircraft is due to be adopted by the French, German, British and Spanish Air Forces. These aircraft are severely needed in the French and German air forces where the airlift capabilities are assured by the relatively small C-160s and C-130s. The British opted to procure 8  C-17s to help meet their operational demands. However smaller, the A-400M has certain capabilities that the bigger jet powered C-17 does not and therefore remained attractive to the RAF.

Events such as Operation Serval demonstrated the need to possess significant Airlift capabilities in order to troops and materiel quickly in areas where access to the sea may not exist geographically or prove to be geo-politically impractical. During Operation Serval, the French Air Force could only provide 25% of the total airlift demand that was required. A further 25% was provided by Allied nations. But a stunning 50% was provided by a private Ukrainian firm aboard its massive An 124s. This solution is both costly and limiting in terms of strategic flexibility. 

Despite it's development hiccups, the A400M Atlas makes a lot of sense. In terms of capabilities, it sits in between the old but reliable C-130 Hercules and the much larger C-17 Globemaster 3s. It would also provide a common platform for Europe's major military forces to train and inter-operate on, reinforcing the feasibility of  the projection of joint European Forces around the globe. As the Americans scale back and refocus their assets to the Pacific,  the major European powers can no longer rely on the might of the US Air Force to provide the same amount of support to its allies as it used to. 

The A400M imposes itself as breath of fresh air to individual countries and their foreign military ambitions but may also serve coalesce the feasibility of pan-European operations, as they become less reliant on US support (and thus approval). All that remains is to see whether the A400M actual conforms to its required performances. 

The JSF: too big to fail ?

In March of this year, a Pentagon report on the F35 leaked, highlighting yet more difficulties and problems facing the Joint Strike Fighter program - and adding more fire to the debate raging around what is considered to be the most expensive weapons development program in history. 

The report highlighted problems with the new HMD (Helmet Mounted Display) blurring the pilots' vision, problems with aft visibility, lagging software development meaning that night time testing and advanced manoeuvres are still off the testing table and issues with the aircraft's ability to operate in cold weather (a serious issue for the Norwegians and the Canadians). This follows a grounding of the entire test fleet after cracks were found in the turbine blades of one of the aircraft. 

The program is thought to be around 7 years behind schedule and its cost has risen by 70% since 2001, averaging around $373 billion dollars. Yet the program endures. Here is why. 

First off, what is the JSF all about ? 

The JSF concept was borne out of the realisation of the relative inefficiency of aircraft development by the US. Essentially the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy would develop their own aircraft independently from each other based around each branches' specific needs and operational requirements. This, coupled with constantly rising costs of development as the hardware gets more and more advanced, led to the conclusion that the next generation fighters of American fighters would have to be developed co-jointly with all branches of the US military in mind. And thus was borne the JSF program. 

The F35 Lightning II (named in honour of the P38 Lightning of World War 2 fame) was designed as a family of single seat, single engined, stealth, fifth generation multi-role fighters whose airframe could be declined into three main variants to fit the operational requirements of the Air Force, Navy and Marines. The F35 A would replace the Air Force's F16s and A-10s, the F35B with STOVL (Short Take Off and Vertical Landing) capabilities would replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier IIs, and the F35C would replace the Navy's F/A 18s. The idea is that the three versions would use many core parts (such as radar, combat software etc...) in order for them to be assembled on the same line, greatly reducing logistical costs. 

On top of that, the program was to be jointly developed by eight other countries (though the US would provide the majority of the funding). The partner countries are the UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Canada, Australia, Turkey and the Netherlands. In recent years, Israel and Japan have also showed interest in the program. This international partnership would help alleviate the cost and boost interoperability. The final contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin and the first F35 flew in 2006. The aircraft is not expected to enter service until after 2016.

So what is going wrong ? 

There are a number of reasons why the project has hit so many hiccups along the way. The aircraft would incorporate many technological advancements that are fairly new and thus need to be tested alongside the aircraft. Many fingers point towards lagging software development for the aircraft's complex electronic suites as one of the points holding the testing back. Others point to significant problems with the airframe. The one-size-fits-all approach is compromising the plane on core capabilities. Each setback translates into delays and rising costs. Aircraft development is fraught with hiccups during the development phase: these are highly complex machines combining myriad different systems to allow the whole thing to work. 

Suffice to say, people are questioning the whole program more and more. With unit costs predicted to rise to around $200 million a pop, what started as a program to save money has become the most expensive weapons development program in US history. 

So why isn't the whole thing being scrapped ? 

On paper the JSF is a smart move and provides a huge leap forward over the current designs in service. The JSF would provide the worlds first true 5th generation multi-role fighter. The fighter would provide the crux of US military power from 2020 onwards. And the US is planning on purchasing 2,400 of the them. 

Simply put the US and the other partner countries have put almost all their eggs into one basket and there is no plan B. The program must succeed. Yes, the combination of ballooning development costs and shrinking defence budgets have casts doubts over the feasibility of the whole thing - and Canada, Australia and Italy have already come out saying that they will probably purchase fewer planes than initially planned -  but so much money has been spent at this point that scrapping the whole thing is no longer feasible. 

On a smaller micro scale, in the US alone the program involves over 1,300 suppliers in 45 different states, assuring over 133, 000 jobs. Even more if you factor in the job creation in the 8 other partner countries. Many Congressmen and Senators who criticise the program have nevertheless never called for the JSF to be aborted. Even the very existence of Lockheed Martin, who solely provides for the military, is thought to be at stake. 

Simply put, we have come too far, and the stakes and vested interests too high for it to be cancelled now. The JSF has become too big to fail.  

The Franco-German Brigade: The new model of European defence ?

Between 6th and 22nd March, the Franco-German Brigade successfully completed Exercise Feldberg 13, the Brigade's annual exercise. Conducted in Saxony this year, the objectives of the exercise were to reinforce inter-operability of German and French elements both at the staff and unit level of the Brigade. The exercise was designed as a tactical free terrain deployment in the framework of initial entry force operations. By all accounts the exercise went well. It should have done: the Franco-German Brigade has been doing this every year for the past 20 years. The trouble is the Brigade has never been engaged in a true joint operations deployment. Why is that ?

First of all, a little history 

The roots of the Franco-German Brigade can be traced back to the signing of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. The Treaty aimed to "reset" French and West German relations and consolidate the political efforts of the newly created EEC (European Economic Community). The Treaty was signed by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. It was seen as a step in the right direction to heal the wounds caused by the animosity between the two nations dating back centuries and which culminated in the horror of World War 2.  

The Brigade itself was created on the 2nd of October 1989. It followed the spirit of the 1963 Treaty, being built upon 4 guiding principles: reconciliation, solidarity, fraternity and cooperation. On the ground, the Brigade is a combined arms unit fulfilling the role of a light armoured brigade. Composed of around 5,000 personnel, its headquarters are currently based in Müllheim, Germany, but its garrisons are based in both France and Germany. The leadership rotates between a German and French officers. The Franco-German Brigade is unique in the world: a combined armed unit under bi-national command. It's creation was no small feat, and many sceptics spoke out saying that the Brigade was a political totem, and that combining forces of two different armies, with their own distinct materiel and doctrines, to fight as a cohesive unit would be impossible. Yet it endures 24 years on. 

At the European level, the Franco-German Brigade constitutes the heart of Eurocorp and is also a critical component of the European rapid reaction forces. The main prerogative of the Brigade is to be deployed in places where France and Germany would also deploy troops - for example as part of SFOR and KFOR, as well as the ISAF in Afghanistan.

Deployed yes, but not together

Whilst elements of the Brigade were deployed in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan, most of these elements were deployed alongside their national counterparts, not as the unified brigade they make up. Most recently, in Afghanistan, French and German troops were deployed to administer completely different regions of the country. The only time when the Brigade constituent regiments operate together tends to be on exercises. This has led to the rather facetious monniker as the "Military Drill World Champions". 

The problem with a the concept of a bi-national fighting force is not military. By all accounts, the Brigade operates well as a whole: the problems are political and legal. France and Germany have different foreign policy attitudes and legal systems. Although fighting together, the French and German regiments have to abide by their own rules of engagement shaped by their respective nation's legal system. For the Brigade to fight as a whole, cohesive unit, France and Germany would have to agree to a common legal operational framework that would satisfy both nations. On top of that, France and Germany would have to agree to a joint deployment in the first place. No small task considering the two countries diverging foreign policy postures. 

So were the sceptics right? Is this just a political symbol?  

If judged by its operational history, perhaps. So far only elements of the Brigade have been deployed, all three times under NATO mandate and alongside their national counterparts, not as the bilateral force is was meant to be. 

Nevertheless the Brigade has shown that the concept from a military standpoint can work - and a unified European defence policy is still in its infancy. However tightening defence budgets around Europe are starting to shape new thinking around European levels of defence co-operation. Case in point: the bilateral agreements between France and Britain in 2010. 

Even if the Franco-German Brigade is just a symbol, it's a strong one. It is proof that old wounds and rivalries can be put aside and perhaps shows us that the future of European defence lies not in a grand policy consensus, but smaller bilateral agreements which allow for more flexibility in deployment and implementation. 

Exercise Foal Eagle: the spark that could reignite the Korean War

Since 1997, every year around March, the combined forces of the US and the South Korea engage in one of the largest military exercise in the world: Foal Eagle. And every year, without fail, the exercise provokes condemnation and sabre-rattling rhetoric from North Korea.

The threat of a showdown between two nuclear capable nations is never an enticing prospect, but this year's round of tensions still originate from Foal Eagle, same as almost every year. So why does North Korea get so riled up about a war game happening in the neighbouring country and, more importantly, why do the US and South Korea keep having it if they know it will provoke anger from North Korea? 

The key goal of Foal Eagle is a show of force to demonstrate the US-South Korean resolve to deter the re-emergence of war in the Korean peninsula and also to improve joint operations capabilities in case of war. Foal Eagle is purely defensive in nature - comprising rear area security and stability operations, onward movement of critical assets to the forward area, special operations, ground manoeuvres, amphibious operations, combat air operations, maritime action group operations and counter special operations forces exercises. 

From the US-South Korean perspective, these exercises have two recurring benefits. Firstly, they strengthen mutual ties, providing the South Koreans with reassurances that they understandably seek in dealing with their belligerent neighbour. Secondly, the exercises act as a deterrent, demonstrating to North Korea that if they ever decide to invade again, the US and South Korea will be ready for them. And, combined with sanctions, they contribute to the ratcheting up of pressure to bring North Korea to the nuclear negotiating table. 

So much for Western calculations, but how does North Korea see things? One little-reported factor is that isolated paranoid regimes have long memories and that this can distort otherwise rational calculations. In 1950, the North Koreans successfully disguised their troop movements towards the South as exercises, up until the point when they began crossing the 38th parallel. It’s quite possible that at some level the North Koreans believe that Foal Eagle is US and South Korea trying to pull the same trick on them. This fear may well be exacerbated by the large naval and amphibious aspect of Foal Eagle: many North Korean generals served during the Korean war and probably remember McArthur's landing at Inchon - which resulted in the rapid fallback of North Korean forces almost to the Chinese border.

The general consensus is that the North Korean chest-beating every time Foal Eagle takes place is intended for domestic consumption. Case in point: Kim Jong Un is young and was promoted through the ranks of the army by virtue of his late father, Kim Jong Il, rather than having earned these promotions. (Incidentally, Kim Jong Il faced the same problem.) The North Korean military is headed by war veterans who probably don't take to kindly to Kim Jon Un's pampered upbringing. The sabre-rattling is generally geared towards keeping the generals happy, as the army is arguably the most powerful political entity in North Korea. 

This is why America is often comfortable with calling North Korea's bluff. Occasionally the North Koreans will back their threats with actions, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010, but the US counts on the restraint of South Korea not to escalate the situation.

This time around however, we are witnessing a potentially toxic combination of factors - a new leader who's an unknown quantity, enhanced missile (and nuclear?) strike capability and new level of bellicose rhetoric. Events have escalated very quickly, with significant military mobilisation happening on both sides of the DMZ. There is a growing fear that Kim Jong Un may have backed himself into a corner: stand down, rejoin negotiations and risk looking weak in front of the generals or commit to a fight and face annihilation. 

Study of an arms deal: why India favours the Rafale

With the recent news that the negotiations on the adoption of the Rafale as India's MMF (Medium Multi-role Fighter) are moving ahead again, it’s worth asking what considerations might have influenced India's decision-making. Especially considering that the MMF tender is also the largest arms deal of the largest democracy in the world.

Ultimately governments make purchase decisions about multi-million dollar military hardware pretty much the same way that you or I might choose a mobile phone provider or car insurance. Essentially it all boils down to 4 things: performance, cost, customer service and trust.

1. Performance

Q: Does the product meet (or exceed) your requirements?

Let’s start by comparing the two finalists in the Indian MMF tender: the Dassault Rafale (France) and the EADS Eurofighter Typhoon (UK, Germany, Spain and Italy). (I’ll get to the eliminated offerings from the US later on.)

Both the Typhoon and Rafale are delta winged, multi-roled, fourth generation fighters (France was originally part of the Eurofighter programme) designed in the late 70's. To a layman, both aircraft are very similar, but the devil is in the detail.

The Eurofighter arguably has the edge in BVR and WVR (Beyond Visual Range and Within Visual Range) air-to-air engagement capabilities. However this does not play in its favour in terms of the Indian tender as the Indians already have a superb air-to-air machine in the form of the Russian Su-30 MIK (reportedly more advanced than the Su-35 Flanker-E in operation in the Russian air force).  

Where the Rafale has the upper hand is that it is considered to be an Omni-role fighter rather than the Multi-role Typhoon. It means that the aircraft was designed to perform various missions at the same time. Multi-role aircraft can be outfitted for various missions but often can only conduct one or two at a time. During the Libyan bombing campaign, the French operated Rafales in pairs, switching from observation to strike to aerial area denial at a moment’s notice. Whereas UK Royal Air Force often deployed 2 types of aircraft simultaneously, the Rafale means that you can perform the same missions with half the number of aircraft. 

Other advantages include a navalised version of the Rafale already in operation in the French navy (important to the Indians, who want to develop their own aircraft carriers), the ability to carry AM 39 Exocet anti-ship missiles as well as nuclear cruise missiles and finally the fact that the Rafale is compatible with French-made munitions already in use in the Indian Air Force on their Mirages (the predecessor of the Rafale), greatly simplifying logistics.

2. Cost

Q: Does the product offer good value for money?

It’s been suggested that the Rafale is being offered 5 to 6 million dollars per unit cheaper than the Typhoon. Were that the case, it’s rumoured that Dassault would effectively be foregoing any profit on the deal. If so, the price would be unbeatable.

3. Customer service

Q: How good is the after-sales service?

Germany (one of the 4 partner countries developing the Eurofighter) has been a more important aviation partner for India, helping to develop a native helicopter programme in recent years. Germany's standing is also helped by the fact that many members of India’s ruling class have been educated there and the German political model is often drawn for inspiration in India. However recent German flakiness in terms of technology transfers - and the ever-looming constraint that German law requires them to cease the supply of weapons and spares to their partners if they were to engage in a war - make Germany too unreliable a defence partner in the eyes of the Indians. 

Conversely France and Russia (India’s premier defence partner) have the advantage of not being subject to national or international arms embargoes when dealing with other states, so the supply chain would almost always be guaranteed. 

4. Trust

Q: Do you trust the product (or rather the people who make it)?  

As with consumer goods, trust is largely earned by getting (1) to (3) right. But trust also comes down to more intangible factors – in particular strength of relationship and political will.    

In this context, the Eurofighter is a thorny proposition for the Indians. It is built by a conglomerate of four nations, each with their own separate foreign policies and arms trade laws. Italy and Spain have never sold anything major to India, military-wise. Britain recently sold a batch of training aircraft to India, but the last combat aircraft sold to India was the Jaguar in the 70s. And that was developed 50/50 with France, so Britain and France share the credit for that. 

Here again the Rafale has the edge. The Indian air force has been using French aircraft since the 1950s and since then it has been involved in four major conflicts. The Indians have found the French to be particularly accommodating in terms of logistics and technology transfers – especially when they asked them to help modify their Mirages for use with Russian- and Israeli-made munitions in 1999.

It is this solid trust (or lack thereof) that eliminated the US offerings very quickly. Other than the fact that the American F16s and F/A 18s were not as advanced as their European rivals, the US has been supplying Pakistan (India's perennial enemy). It is also a well known fact that the US sold "incomplete" F16s to Pakistan (they lacked advanced radar), both of these  factors making the US an unreliable partner in the eyes of India. 

In the end, it’s probably trust that will have tipped the balance in France’s favour. A neat reminder that, like consumers, arms buyers want to have warm and cuddly feelings too.