Rising Sun?

The recent announcement that Japan is increasing its defence budget for the first time in 10 years was predictably met by disapproval from their Chinese neighbours. 


This increase in budget is designed to fund a new shopping spree by the Japanese Self Defence Forces, including drones, VF-22 Ospreys, Aegis Destroyers, amphibious vehicles and new submarines as well as the yet unreleased F-35 A joint strike fighter. This follows the recent launch in August of of the JDS Izumo, a so-called "helicopter destroyer", by the Japanese Self Defence Navy - their largest warship since the Second World War. A point that the Chinese were quick to pick up on, arguing that the huge ship could be converted into a fully fledged aircraft carrier (the Izumo is only 20m shorter than the French Charles de Gaulle). 

All of this has helped stoke the flames of China and Japan's territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Isles in the South China Sea. China has many other unresolved territorial claims in the Yellow, South China and East China Seas, but what's so significant about this dispute in particular? 

The answer is that Japan is being increasingly assertive in providing for its own security and pushing the limits of their own post-war Peace Constitution, imposed by the US in 1945. This was designed to ensure that Japan would never again possess the ability to project power abroad (read invade its neighbours again). But under Shinzo Abe, Japan is re-evaluating its security role in the region and looking both to increase its military self-reliance and reduce its dependency on the US. 

Hence Japan's latest shopping list, which would provide Japan with power projection capabilities that it has not possessed until now, despite fielding the second largest navy in the Pacific. Shinzo Abe has himself called for changes to the Constitution to make this possible. Intriguingly, the US seem to have shifted their position too - having been the prime architects of the military neutering of Japan in 1945, they are now being conspicuously silent.  

Although direct military confrontation between Japan and the PRC seems unlikely, the current Cold War style stand-off does raise some interesting questions about the future of security in Asia. The rise of nationalism in both China and Japan will no doubt escalate tensions further, potentially leading to an arms race in Asia (the region is already the fastest-growing in terms of defence spending). Should that happen, people tend to look to the US to maintain the status quo - but how long will that last if America continues its seemingly unconditional support of Japanese military expansionism, thus backing the Chinese into a dangerous corner?


Despite pledges of Japanese aid towards other ASEAN countries, it is unclear yet how Japan's renewed nationalistic rhetoric and posturing will be accepted elsewhere. Other Asian nations may well be afraid of China's military expansionism, but that does not signify they are ready to accept Japan as the key Asian alternative. The experience of Japanese nationalism has left its mark on Asia, just as German nationalism did in Europe, and many have not forgiven or forgotten the Japanese for their actions during colonial rule (a feeling exacerbated perhaps by Japan's own half-hearted mea culpas on the matter). 

The A400 M Atlas: The New Heart of European Airlift Capabilities ?

Well it's almost here, sort of. The Bastille Day air show was spearheaded by an A400m (MSN7) escorted by a French air force Rafale and a German Eurofighter Typhoon over the Champs Elysée. MSN7 is still sporting it's Airbus Military registration but is due to enter in the French Air Force in the following days , with MSN8 entering service later in September. 

The program is 4 years late and significantly over budget but it marks an important milestone in European Airlift capabilities. The aircraft is due to be adopted by the French, German, British and Spanish Air Forces. These aircraft are severely needed in the French and German air forces where the airlift capabilities are assured by the relatively small C-160s and C-130s. The British opted to procure 8  C-17s to help meet their operational demands. However smaller, the A-400M has certain capabilities that the bigger jet powered C-17 does not and therefore remained attractive to the RAF.

Events such as Operation Serval demonstrated the need to possess significant Airlift capabilities in order to troops and materiel quickly in areas where access to the sea may not exist geographically or prove to be geo-politically impractical. During Operation Serval, the French Air Force could only provide 25% of the total airlift demand that was required. A further 25% was provided by Allied nations. But a stunning 50% was provided by a private Ukrainian firm aboard its massive An 124s. This solution is both costly and limiting in terms of strategic flexibility. 

Despite it's development hiccups, the A400M Atlas makes a lot of sense. In terms of capabilities, it sits in between the old but reliable C-130 Hercules and the much larger C-17 Globemaster 3s. It would also provide a common platform for Europe's major military forces to train and inter-operate on, reinforcing the feasibility of  the projection of joint European Forces around the globe. As the Americans scale back and refocus their assets to the Pacific,  the major European powers can no longer rely on the might of the US Air Force to provide the same amount of support to its allies as it used to. 

The A400M imposes itself as breath of fresh air to individual countries and their foreign military ambitions but may also serve coalesce the feasibility of pan-European operations, as they become less reliant on US support (and thus approval). All that remains is to see whether the A400M actual conforms to its required performances. 

The JSF: too big to fail ?

In March of this year, a Pentagon report on the F35 leaked, highlighting yet more difficulties and problems facing the Joint Strike Fighter program - and adding more fire to the debate raging around what is considered to be the most expensive weapons development program in history. 

The report highlighted problems with the new HMD (Helmet Mounted Display) blurring the pilots' vision, problems with aft visibility, lagging software development meaning that night time testing and advanced manoeuvres are still off the testing table and issues with the aircraft's ability to operate in cold weather (a serious issue for the Norwegians and the Canadians). This follows a grounding of the entire test fleet after cracks were found in the turbine blades of one of the aircraft. 

The program is thought to be around 7 years behind schedule and its cost has risen by 70% since 2001, averaging around $373 billion dollars. Yet the program endures. Here is why. 

First off, what is the JSF all about ? 

The JSF concept was borne out of the realisation of the relative inefficiency of aircraft development by the US. Essentially the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy would develop their own aircraft independently from each other based around each branches' specific needs and operational requirements. This, coupled with constantly rising costs of development as the hardware gets more and more advanced, led to the conclusion that the next generation fighters of American fighters would have to be developed co-jointly with all branches of the US military in mind. And thus was borne the JSF program. 

The F35 Lightning II (named in honour of the P38 Lightning of World War 2 fame) was designed as a family of single seat, single engined, stealth, fifth generation multi-role fighters whose airframe could be declined into three main variants to fit the operational requirements of the Air Force, Navy and Marines. The F35 A would replace the Air Force's F16s and A-10s, the F35B with STOVL (Short Take Off and Vertical Landing) capabilities would replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier IIs, and the F35C would replace the Navy's F/A 18s. The idea is that the three versions would use many core parts (such as radar, combat software etc...) in order for them to be assembled on the same line, greatly reducing logistical costs. 

On top of that, the program was to be jointly developed by eight other countries (though the US would provide the majority of the funding). The partner countries are the UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Canada, Australia, Turkey and the Netherlands. In recent years, Israel and Japan have also showed interest in the program. This international partnership would help alleviate the cost and boost interoperability. The final contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin and the first F35 flew in 2006. The aircraft is not expected to enter service until after 2016.

So what is going wrong ? 

There are a number of reasons why the project has hit so many hiccups along the way. The aircraft would incorporate many technological advancements that are fairly new and thus need to be tested alongside the aircraft. Many fingers point towards lagging software development for the aircraft's complex electronic suites as one of the points holding the testing back. Others point to significant problems with the airframe. The one-size-fits-all approach is compromising the plane on core capabilities. Each setback translates into delays and rising costs. Aircraft development is fraught with hiccups during the development phase: these are highly complex machines combining myriad different systems to allow the whole thing to work. 

Suffice to say, people are questioning the whole program more and more. With unit costs predicted to rise to around $200 million a pop, what started as a program to save money has become the most expensive weapons development program in US history. 

So why isn't the whole thing being scrapped ? 

On paper the JSF is a smart move and provides a huge leap forward over the current designs in service. The JSF would provide the worlds first true 5th generation multi-role fighter. The fighter would provide the crux of US military power from 2020 onwards. And the US is planning on purchasing 2,400 of the them. 

Simply put the US and the other partner countries have put almost all their eggs into one basket and there is no plan B. The program must succeed. Yes, the combination of ballooning development costs and shrinking defence budgets have casts doubts over the feasibility of the whole thing - and Canada, Australia and Italy have already come out saying that they will probably purchase fewer planes than initially planned -  but so much money has been spent at this point that scrapping the whole thing is no longer feasible. 

On a smaller micro scale, in the US alone the program involves over 1,300 suppliers in 45 different states, assuring over 133, 000 jobs. Even more if you factor in the job creation in the 8 other partner countries. Many Congressmen and Senators who criticise the program have nevertheless never called for the JSF to be aborted. Even the very existence of Lockheed Martin, who solely provides for the military, is thought to be at stake. 

Simply put, we have come too far, and the stakes and vested interests too high for it to be cancelled now. The JSF has become too big to fail.  

The Franco-German Brigade: The new model of European defence ?

Between 6th and 22nd March, the Franco-German Brigade successfully completed Exercise Feldberg 13, the Brigade's annual exercise. Conducted in Saxony this year, the objectives of the exercise were to reinforce inter-operability of German and French elements both at the staff and unit level of the Brigade. The exercise was designed as a tactical free terrain deployment in the framework of initial entry force operations. By all accounts the exercise went well. It should have done: the Franco-German Brigade has been doing this every year for the past 20 years. The trouble is the Brigade has never been engaged in a true joint operations deployment. Why is that ?

First of all, a little history 

The roots of the Franco-German Brigade can be traced back to the signing of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. The Treaty aimed to "reset" French and West German relations and consolidate the political efforts of the newly created EEC (European Economic Community). The Treaty was signed by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. It was seen as a step in the right direction to heal the wounds caused by the animosity between the two nations dating back centuries and which culminated in the horror of World War 2.  

The Brigade itself was created on the 2nd of October 1989. It followed the spirit of the 1963 Treaty, being built upon 4 guiding principles: reconciliation, solidarity, fraternity and cooperation. On the ground, the Brigade is a combined arms unit fulfilling the role of a light armoured brigade. Composed of around 5,000 personnel, its headquarters are currently based in Müllheim, Germany, but its garrisons are based in both France and Germany. The leadership rotates between a German and French officers. The Franco-German Brigade is unique in the world: a combined armed unit under bi-national command. It's creation was no small feat, and many sceptics spoke out saying that the Brigade was a political totem, and that combining forces of two different armies, with their own distinct materiel and doctrines, to fight as a cohesive unit would be impossible. Yet it endures 24 years on. 

At the European level, the Franco-German Brigade constitutes the heart of Eurocorp and is also a critical component of the European rapid reaction forces. The main prerogative of the Brigade is to be deployed in places where France and Germany would also deploy troops - for example as part of SFOR and KFOR, as well as the ISAF in Afghanistan.

Deployed yes, but not together

Whilst elements of the Brigade were deployed in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan, most of these elements were deployed alongside their national counterparts, not as the unified brigade they make up. Most recently, in Afghanistan, French and German troops were deployed to administer completely different regions of the country. The only time when the Brigade constituent regiments operate together tends to be on exercises. This has led to the rather facetious monniker as the "Military Drill World Champions". 

The problem with a the concept of a bi-national fighting force is not military. By all accounts, the Brigade operates well as a whole: the problems are political and legal. France and Germany have different foreign policy attitudes and legal systems. Although fighting together, the French and German regiments have to abide by their own rules of engagement shaped by their respective nation's legal system. For the Brigade to fight as a whole, cohesive unit, France and Germany would have to agree to a common legal operational framework that would satisfy both nations. On top of that, France and Germany would have to agree to a joint deployment in the first place. No small task considering the two countries diverging foreign policy postures. 

So were the sceptics right? Is this just a political symbol?  

If judged by its operational history, perhaps. So far only elements of the Brigade have been deployed, all three times under NATO mandate and alongside their national counterparts, not as the bilateral force is was meant to be. 

Nevertheless the Brigade has shown that the concept from a military standpoint can work - and a unified European defence policy is still in its infancy. However tightening defence budgets around Europe are starting to shape new thinking around European levels of defence co-operation. Case in point: the bilateral agreements between France and Britain in 2010. 

Even if the Franco-German Brigade is just a symbol, it's a strong one. It is proof that old wounds and rivalries can be put aside and perhaps shows us that the future of European defence lies not in a grand policy consensus, but smaller bilateral agreements which allow for more flexibility in deployment and implementation. 

Exercise Foal Eagle: the spark that could reignite the Korean War

Since 1997, every year around March, the combined forces of the US and the South Korea engage in one of the largest military exercise in the world: Foal Eagle. And every year, without fail, the exercise provokes condemnation and sabre-rattling rhetoric from North Korea.

The threat of a showdown between two nuclear capable nations is never an enticing prospect, but this year's round of tensions still originate from Foal Eagle, same as almost every year. So why does North Korea get so riled up about a war game happening in the neighbouring country and, more importantly, why do the US and South Korea keep having it if they know it will provoke anger from North Korea? 

The key goal of Foal Eagle is a show of force to demonstrate the US-South Korean resolve to deter the re-emergence of war in the Korean peninsula and also to improve joint operations capabilities in case of war. Foal Eagle is purely defensive in nature - comprising rear area security and stability operations, onward movement of critical assets to the forward area, special operations, ground manoeuvres, amphibious operations, combat air operations, maritime action group operations and counter special operations forces exercises. 

From the US-South Korean perspective, these exercises have two recurring benefits. Firstly, they strengthen mutual ties, providing the South Koreans with reassurances that they understandably seek in dealing with their belligerent neighbour. Secondly, the exercises act as a deterrent, demonstrating to North Korea that if they ever decide to invade again, the US and South Korea will be ready for them. And, combined with sanctions, they contribute to the ratcheting up of pressure to bring North Korea to the nuclear negotiating table. 

So much for Western calculations, but how does North Korea see things? One little-reported factor is that isolated paranoid regimes have long memories and that this can distort otherwise rational calculations. In 1950, the North Koreans successfully disguised their troop movements towards the South as exercises, up until the point when they began crossing the 38th parallel. It’s quite possible that at some level the North Koreans believe that Foal Eagle is US and South Korea trying to pull the same trick on them. This fear may well be exacerbated by the large naval and amphibious aspect of Foal Eagle: many North Korean generals served during the Korean war and probably remember McArthur's landing at Inchon - which resulted in the rapid fallback of North Korean forces almost to the Chinese border.

The general consensus is that the North Korean chest-beating every time Foal Eagle takes place is intended for domestic consumption. Case in point: Kim Jong Un is young and was promoted through the ranks of the army by virtue of his late father, Kim Jong Il, rather than having earned these promotions. (Incidentally, Kim Jong Il faced the same problem.) The North Korean military is headed by war veterans who probably don't take to kindly to Kim Jon Un's pampered upbringing. The sabre-rattling is generally geared towards keeping the generals happy, as the army is arguably the most powerful political entity in North Korea. 

This is why America is often comfortable with calling North Korea's bluff. Occasionally the North Koreans will back their threats with actions, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010, but the US counts on the restraint of South Korea not to escalate the situation.

This time around however, we are witnessing a potentially toxic combination of factors - a new leader who's an unknown quantity, enhanced missile (and nuclear?) strike capability and new level of bellicose rhetoric. Events have escalated very quickly, with significant military mobilisation happening on both sides of the DMZ. There is a growing fear that Kim Jong Un may have backed himself into a corner: stand down, rejoin negotiations and risk looking weak in front of the generals or commit to a fight and face annihilation. 

Study of an arms deal: why India favours the Rafale

With the recent news that the negotiations on the adoption of the Rafale as India's MMF (Medium Multi-role Fighter) are moving ahead again, it’s worth asking what considerations might have influenced India's decision-making. Especially considering that the MMF tender is also the largest arms deal of the largest democracy in the world.

Ultimately governments make purchase decisions about multi-million dollar military hardware pretty much the same way that you or I might choose a mobile phone provider or car insurance. Essentially it all boils down to 4 things: performance, cost, customer service and trust.

1. Performance

Q: Does the product meet (or exceed) your requirements?

Let’s start by comparing the two finalists in the Indian MMF tender: the Dassault Rafale (France) and the EADS Eurofighter Typhoon (UK, Germany, Spain and Italy). (I’ll get to the eliminated offerings from the US later on.)

Both the Typhoon and Rafale are delta winged, multi-roled, fourth generation fighters (France was originally part of the Eurofighter programme) designed in the late 70's. To a layman, both aircraft are very similar, but the devil is in the detail.

The Eurofighter arguably has the edge in BVR and WVR (Beyond Visual Range and Within Visual Range) air-to-air engagement capabilities. However this does not play in its favour in terms of the Indian tender as the Indians already have a superb air-to-air machine in the form of the Russian Su-30 MIK (reportedly more advanced than the Su-35 Flanker-E in operation in the Russian air force).  

Where the Rafale has the upper hand is that it is considered to be an Omni-role fighter rather than the Multi-role Typhoon. It means that the aircraft was designed to perform various missions at the same time. Multi-role aircraft can be outfitted for various missions but often can only conduct one or two at a time. During the Libyan bombing campaign, the French operated Rafales in pairs, switching from observation to strike to aerial area denial at a moment’s notice. Whereas UK Royal Air Force often deployed 2 types of aircraft simultaneously, the Rafale means that you can perform the same missions with half the number of aircraft. 

Other advantages include a navalised version of the Rafale already in operation in the French navy (important to the Indians, who want to develop their own aircraft carriers), the ability to carry AM 39 Exocet anti-ship missiles as well as nuclear cruise missiles and finally the fact that the Rafale is compatible with French-made munitions already in use in the Indian Air Force on their Mirages (the predecessor of the Rafale), greatly simplifying logistics.

2. Cost

Q: Does the product offer good value for money?

It’s been suggested that the Rafale is being offered 5 to 6 million dollars per unit cheaper than the Typhoon. Were that the case, it’s rumoured that Dassault would effectively be foregoing any profit on the deal. If so, the price would be unbeatable.

3. Customer service

Q: How good is the after-sales service?

Germany (one of the 4 partner countries developing the Eurofighter) has been a more important aviation partner for India, helping to develop a native helicopter programme in recent years. Germany's standing is also helped by the fact that many members of India’s ruling class have been educated there and the German political model is often drawn for inspiration in India. However recent German flakiness in terms of technology transfers - and the ever-looming constraint that German law requires them to cease the supply of weapons and spares to their partners if they were to engage in a war - make Germany too unreliable a defence partner in the eyes of the Indians. 

Conversely France and Russia (India’s premier defence partner) have the advantage of not being subject to national or international arms embargoes when dealing with other states, so the supply chain would almost always be guaranteed. 

4. Trust

Q: Do you trust the product (or rather the people who make it)?  

As with consumer goods, trust is largely earned by getting (1) to (3) right. But trust also comes down to more intangible factors – in particular strength of relationship and political will.    

In this context, the Eurofighter is a thorny proposition for the Indians. It is built by a conglomerate of four nations, each with their own separate foreign policies and arms trade laws. Italy and Spain have never sold anything major to India, military-wise. Britain recently sold a batch of training aircraft to India, but the last combat aircraft sold to India was the Jaguar in the 70s. And that was developed 50/50 with France, so Britain and France share the credit for that. 

Here again the Rafale has the edge. The Indian air force has been using French aircraft since the 1950s and since then it has been involved in four major conflicts. The Indians have found the French to be particularly accommodating in terms of logistics and technology transfers – especially when they asked them to help modify their Mirages for use with Russian- and Israeli-made munitions in 1999.

It is this solid trust (or lack thereof) that eliminated the US offerings very quickly. Other than the fact that the American F16s and F/A 18s were not as advanced as their European rivals, the US has been supplying Pakistan (India's perennial enemy). It is also a well known fact that the US sold "incomplete" F16s to Pakistan (they lacked advanced radar), both of these  factors making the US an unreliable partner in the eyes of India. 

In the end, it’s probably trust that will have tipped the balance in France’s favour. A neat reminder that, like consumers, arms buyers want to have warm and cuddly feelings too.

Arming rebels : Playing with fire ?

Last week both the French and British governments announced that they would seek to lift an EU blanket arms embargo on Syria, allowing them to begin supplying opposition forces to Assad's regime with weapons and munitions. The move was backed by US yesterday during a conference by the US Secretary of State John Kerry. However as of right now, Britain and France have yet to convince their Europeans partners, especially Germany, that lifting the embargo would help to stabilise the rapport de force between the various factions fighting in Syria. 

France and Britain's positions are understandable: the war has been raging on for 2 years, it has displaced over 450,000 Syrians and almost triggered a war with neighbouring Turkey. The stakes are high. Assad's regime has much to answer for, including the massacre of civilians by Shabiha militias, but what keeps Western politicians up at night is Syria's extensive arsenal of chemical weapons. Will Assad ever use them against his people? Unlikely since he would probably lose support of Russia and China. But what if the Sunni extremist factions of the rebellion got hold of them? Could they be used against Israel or sold to extremist movements? More likely they could be used in the inevitable retributions that would follow the collapse of the Assad regime.

The history of Syria is marred with tensions between the Sunni majority and the Alawite population, of which the Assad family is part. In the 14th century Alawites were declared enemies of Islam by radical Sunni clerics and the various fatwas issued against them resulted in massacres. The Alawites finally got their own back when Hafez Al-Assad seized power. Originally a Baathist (who strove for the creation of a unified secular state across Arab lands) Al-Assad senior became embroiled in a civil conflict against the Muslim Brotherhood, eventually culminating in the eradication of the Brotherhood at the brutal Battle of Hama in 1982. Since then the Alawites have enjoyed preferential treatment under the Syrian regime, stoking the flames of ancient hatred and resentment against them. Many radical Sunnis still consider them the worst enemies of Islam and it is conceivable that atrocious exactions will befall them if the Assad regime were to collapse.  

So what do Britain and France hope to accomplish by arming the rebels?

Assad is being supported by Russia (as well as Iran and their proxy army Hezbollah, who want to extend Shia influence in the region). The Sunni rebels are being supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar (two Sunni nations). But what about the moderate/secular branch of the rebellion? That is the imbalance that France and Britain want to address. If the Assad regime were to be toppled today, the Sunni rebel factions would be in a clear position of strength. As much as the West wants to see Assad gone, the idea of a radical Sunni Syria, with access to a large stockpile of chemical weapons is not a particularly appealing one. (Especially to Israel.) So by arming the "secular" branch of the rebellion, the French and the British hope to redress the balance of power within the opposition, keeping the radicals in check if the Assad regime were to fall. 

It's an extremely risky proposition though. First of all, arming the rebels would be a breach of international law, as the Russian Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov recently pointed out. It wouldn't be the first time in history that states have armed rebel factions, especially during the Cold War, but this could have serious repercussions for France and Britain in terms of international relations. This could be worsened by the fact that Britain and France would have no control of how the weapons and training they provide would be used in the conflict. It is very possible that in-fightingcould break out between the various rebel factions if the Assad regime were to be deposed. All that France and Britain would have accomplished would then be the extension of the civil war - with all the unpleasant consequences that civil wars tend to have. And the civilians, as usual, would bear the brunt of these consequences. 

Britain and France's proposal is driven by two calculations - one geo-political, the other domestic. Firstly an attempt to break the political deadlock at the international level. Assad enjoys protection and military support from Russia and China. This effectively shields him from direct military intervention by Western powers. As unethical as Russia's support of the Assad regime is, their arms supply are not illegal and there is not much that the US, France and Britain can do about it. This is causing much frustration and arming the rebels is seen as "doing something". The second factor is political opportunism. Things aren't exactly going well domestically for David Cameron and François Hollande, but recent military involvement by the two nations during the Arab Spring have emboldened the two leaders on the international stage and given them a taste for statesmanship.

For the moment Assad has the upper hand. He is in control of 70% of Syria and enjoys the protection of powerful allies. There is very little sign that things could change and arming the rebels is a reckless and short-sighted solution - if you can call it a solution at all. Arming sections of the rebels could bring the conclusion to the conflict sooner, however it is more likely that it would fuel an extension of war in the resulting power vacuum that would inevitably follow the downfall of Bashar Al-Assad. How many more would die or be displaced then?  

Unmanned warfighting: The legacy of the Industrial Revolution

The success of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) has made the drone business one of the fastest growing sectors in the aviation industry. It is thought that the US military has over 7,000 of them, from only 50 a decade ago.

Drones have proved their usefulness in conventional military applications (surveillance, overwatch of combat troops and close air support for example) as well as intelligence operations (the CIA operates a significant number of drones independently from the military). Their success has also opened up a huge new market in commercial and civilian uses for unmanned vehicles in the air, on land and on sea. 

What excites most journalists – and understandably so – are the ethical and legal issues raised by the use of drones in military and law enforcement roles. Notably habeas corpus, collateral damage and right to privacy. At a deeper level, so the argument goes, drones are challenging the moral calculus of warfare - built as it used to be on the value of human lives risked or saved and age-old martial values of honour and sacrifice. 

Viewed through the lens of history however, there is nothing intrinsically revolutionary about drones in terms of either the underpinning technologies or the calculations driving their development.  

Put simply, a drone is an armed plane that can fly itself (or be flown remotely) and target with precision. The novelty lies not the component parts but in the bundling. After all, we’ve been building war planes for almost 100 years, autopilot features have been around on aircraft for over 40 years. The success of drones is in combining old concepts (such as a planes carrying bombs) with new technology like GPS and satellite communications. Drones simply enhance a portfolio of already existing capabilities.

More fundamentally, drone warfare is arguably just a natural step in a 200 year old evolutionary continuum. 

The industrial revolution kickstarted the mechanisation of labour and it wasn't long before the military of industrialised states began seeing the potential of these technological breakthroughs in military applications. More and more machines were introduced into military arsenals - trains, aircraft, armoured vehicles, trucks etc. Machines increasingly complemented and sometimes replaced the role of man and animal both on and off the battlefield. Take the Gatling gun, which made its battlefield debut in 1862. Dr Gatling developed the weapon in order to reduce the number of overall lives lost in the American Civil War. The idea was that a Gatling Gun crew could do the same job as a company of riflemen - thus reducing the need for more soldiers on the battlefield and reducing the overall number of people put in harm’s way.  

As armies modernise, hardware becomes more complex and thus more and more expensive to build, maintain and train on. Governments expect their money's worth, hence the increasing emphasis on the survivability of military hardware. From an infantryman's Personal Protective Equipment to modern electronic counter-measures, an increasing amount of research and development is being directed towards safeguarding a government's "investments". Reducing/eliminating human risk is simply part of the same calculation.  

And what if we look forward along the same continuum, say 50 years into the future? My prediction is that the future will re-frame our view of the ethics of drones, just as the past helps frame our understanding of the technology.

France in Mali : what's going on ?

Mali ? Isn't that in...?

The rapidity by which France deployed its military assets in Mali took many people (including myself) by surprise. 

I mean, the last time Mali was featured in the mainstream press was a year ago, when the disgruntled army deposed the then president (and ex-general) Touré. The coup naturally garnered the standard fare of international condemnations. But for many people it was simply a case of "disgruntled and poorly funded/managed army deposes president, who himself deposed a so-called president almost 20 years ago". So business as usual in Africa then. 

Only it wasn't. Since the March Revolution (22-28 March 1992), Mali was considered to be one of the most stable and, politically at least, successful West African countries. You can bet the donors were pleased: finally a country that took their money and acted like a true democracy! From 1992 to 2012 there were only 2 presidents but their mandates were regarded as constitutional and the elections that got them there to be fair. It was the Malian army's defeat against a guerrilla group, the MNLA, that prompted the coup. 

Northern Mali is mainly populated by Tuareg and Arabic ethnic groups who are mostly nomadic. In the late 80's and 90's they began returning to northern Mali and demanded more autonomy for Azawad (what they call Northern Mali). This never really sat well with the leadership in Bamako and eventually the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) allied itself with Islamic groups such as Ansar Dine and AQMI (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) who were already operating from the relative safety of the Sahara/Sahel for some time. On 16th January 2012, the alliance of the secular MNLA and the Islamic AQMI then began to push south and,  by March, the battered Malian army had deposed the Malian president. On 5th April, after the capture of Douentza, the MNLA called off its offensive and declared independence for Azawad. 

Yes but why, I hear you ask, have the French stormed into Mali so suddenly? And why the French, instead of say, the Americans ? 

The short answer to that is because the Malian government asked France to intervene. 

After the coup, international and local pressure managed to restore an interim government in Mali, thanks in part to the intervention of Allassane Ouattara, president of Cote D'Ivoire. Ouattara is himself in power thanks to French military intervention after the French got fed up with the antics of Laurent Gbagbo, the sitting president at the time. But Gbagbo's short -lived but ballsy blackmail of France and its consequence aren't quite relevant here. 

During the coup, the MNLA and its allies tried to seize the opportunity for more land grab, but eventually the secular movement found itself at odds with its Islamic allies, as the Northern population began to reject the imposition of Sharia law. The MNLA was eventually kicked out of Azawad and - confronted by unstable circumstances and the renewed advance of Islamic forces to the south - the interim government called on France for support. 

Why France? Well the colonial ties are undeniable, of course. Being an ex French colony, Mali has kept close diplomatic and economic ties with France since its independence in 1960. But more practically, France has maintained several military bases in Africa: including in Djibouti, Chad, Cote D'Ivoire and Gabon. These bases also include airfields, which are essential for projecting troops. France has also been conducting special forces operations in the Sahel for some while, as a response to the threat of AQMI. Overall France can put infantry, light armour and air assets in theatre anywhere in West Africa in a matter of hours. In fact most of France's QRF's (Quick Reaction Forces) are based in Africa just for this kind of occasion. 

US military presence is actually rather limited in Africa. Aside from a contingent of US marines based in Djibouti, along side French Legionnaires, US military operations tend towards support actions. Most of their troops deployed in Africa are special forces on foreign exchange and training missions, but they have nothing of the kind needed to conduct a serious ground war on hand. 

France is the only western power capable of projecting sizeable forces, so quickly, in West Africa. Out of all the modern western armies, the French army is also the most experienced when it comes to fighting in Africa, having been there for almost 200 years. 

So France has plenty of hardware in Africa, and unafraid to intervene since it renounced its colonies. Post-colonialism anyone ? 

No. France was invited, in extreme urgency, as military aid to be provided by neighbouring African countries (which had been agreed up almost a year ago, and was sanctioned by the UN) failed materialise. This is Africa, so no real big surprise there. It is commonly agreed that French intervention saved Mali from Islamic takeover. And that's the point. 

This isn't one of those nasty civil wars that have unfortunately afflicted Africa for so long, where things get so bad the West has to step in. Many have likened French intervention in Africa as a patronising parent separating bickering children, but French military intervention has saved lives by putting a stop to extreme political violence that often takes place these during civil wars. The battle of Kolwezi in 1979 is a good example of that. 

Northern Mali has been infiltrated and then straight up invaded by fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups, often composed of foreigners. These groups are intent on waging jihad and imposing Sharia law in the territories they operate. Mali is the new front in the global war on terror, and as such has received support from the international community. #

Furthermore, although French foreign policy often rests on obtaining consensus and the approval of the international community, the French will not hesitate to act unilaterally to defend their interests. After Indochina, the French realised that they could no longer impose military might all over the world, so decided to focus on protecting French interests closest to home: Africa. During the decolonisation period, the French made several discreet agreements with the newly independent countries, including many security guarantees. Although informal, these guarantees were very real, backed by the presence of bases in the region and actual interventions - almost 50 in as many years. 

And they worked. Apart from the notable exception of Cote D'Ivoire, these security guarantees did a relatively good job of keeping the peace in West Africa. These informal guarantees were eventually abandoned in a formal way when the French government almost got accidentally caught up defending the Hutus in Rwanda as they set about slaughtering the Tutsis. In the wake of this France did not intervene in Cote D'Ivoire in 1999 (the decision was vetoed by President Chirac), but found itself back there anyway in 2002 after Gbagbo's infamous blackmail trick. Old habits.

So what now ?

Good question: there are many more unknowns at this stage. When will the African contingent arrive and who will take charge of the campaign? How long will the fighting go on for? Will other Western powers put boots on the ground? Will the case of the MNLA (now in accord with Malian government) be dealt with officially now? Will the Malian army be held into account for its alleged abuses? And if the Islamic fighters are kicked out of Mali, where will they go? Etc, etc...

The fact is what is playing out in Mali is important not just for France but for the whole world. Do the rich countries have economic interests in the region? Absolutely. But this is about more than protecting gold mines, this about denying the enemy a safe haven where it can continue its campaign of kidnappings and drug running to fund terrorist operations. This is about defending a legitimate government against a foreign fundamentalist force intent on imposing their belief systems on the whole of West Africa, by force. 

And for the French, this is also about being true to their word, however unofficial it may be.